# AT: Advantage CPs

## AT: Net Assessment Office

#### Perm do both – CP isn’t mutually exclusive to the aff

#### Net Assessment is a failure and waste of money

Senator Chuck Grassley, 2-7-2022, "Grassley: The Office of Net Assessment is a Failure," <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/remarks/grassley-the-office-of-net-assessment-is-a-failure> GH-PJ

Accordingly, it appears that the Office of Net Assessment gets to keep operating like a Pentagon slush fund for irrelevant and political research projects. On [February 5, 2020](https://www.grassley.senate.gov/download/2020-02-05-ona-to-ceg-halper-follow-up), the Director of the Office of Net Assessment told me, “We review all deliverables to ensure they’re consistent with the statement of work. We evaluate each deliverable to assess whether we should seek additional information or require a resubmission of commissioned work.” I’ll return to that statement in a bit. In [December 2020](https://www.grassley.senate.gov/download/2020-12-18-ceg-to-dod-ig-ona-evaluation), I asked the inspector general to take a deeper dive into the Office of Net Assessment’s contracting practices. That means connecting all the dots in the contract transactions to ensure everything matches up. The inspector general reviewed 20 contracts. On [January 25, 2022](http://www.dodig.mil/Reports/Audits-and-Evaluations/Article/2913927/audit-of-the-office-of-net-assessments-contract-administration-procedures-dodig/), the inspector general issued its results and found, in part: · Office of Net Assessment acquisition personnel inappropriately performed Contracting Officer Representative duties for 20 contracts. · ONA acquisition personnel and an office providing contract support didn’t maintain complete contract files, including pre-award and contract administration documentation. That also included the failure to maintain signed contracts and modifications. Since 2019, I’ve repeatedly asked for a full accounting of Stefan Halper’s contracts. Either they never had one or they’ve decided to obstruct Congress. · ONA acquisition personnel and an office providing contract support inappropriately approved invoices for payments totaling 9.8 million dollars due to a lack of oversight. And that’s just for the 20 contracts the Inspector General sampled. Without required supporting documentation for payment, the door is wide open to fraud, theft and improper payments. · Without established and documented surveillance measures for ONA service contracts, the Office of Net Assessment may not have received all services outlined in contractor statements of work. · At this point, the next finding is no surprise: the ONA didn’t administer contracts in accordance with federal, Defense Department and Washington Headquarters Services internal regulations and policies. Further, the audit states, “Office of Net Assessment Acquisition personnel can’t verify whether they received services, valued at 4.1 million dollars, in accordance with the statement of work.” Now, let’s return to that quote from the Director of the ONA, “We review all deliverables to ensure they’re consistent with the statement of work. We evaluate each deliverable to assess whether we should seek additional information or require a resubmission of commissioned work.” Based on the available evidence, his statement is false. Here’s the bottom line: the ONA has no clue what they’re paying for and whether they’ve even received complete work product. And whatever they’re actually doing, it’s not in compliance with federal regulations, policy and law. This is a complete embarrassment and a slap in the face to the American taxpayer. While the ONA wasted millions of dollars in taxpayer money every year, the communist Chinese government developed hypersonic missiles that can travel the globe. If this unit isn’t doing the job they’re supposed to do, why are we still funding it? It’d be better to take their 20 million dollar budget and give it our service members. At least we know they’ve earned it. A government slush fund will always be a government slush fund unless the Congress steps up and fixes the problem.

## AT: Multinational Observer Controller Teams

#### Perm do both – CP isn’t mutually exclusive to the aff

#### Tech and info key to interoperability – means that the aff is key

[Szilveszter Szeleczki](https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Szilveszter-Szeleczki-2160359491), June 2019, "(PDF) Interpreting the Interoperability of the Nato’s Communication and Information Systems," ResearchGate, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334677622_Interpreting_the_Interoperability_of_the_Nato's_Communication_and_Information_Systems> GH-PJ

In our current network-based world, cooperation between different participants in all areas, for example political, defense, economic or cultural, has an increasing role. Because of this the importance of interoperability between participants is also increasing. The central presence of information also highlights the concept and influencing factors of interoperability. The participants can be individuals, organizations or other groups, where a comprehensive flow of information and the constant presence of the information space is essential for its effective and efficient activity. Interoperability issues are also a key component of the military transformation process of NATO, so basic information questions should be answered to achieve the target system. Nowadays, interoperability requirements and definitions are subject to periodic changes in order to facilitate high-tech joint exercises using advanced technology.

## AT: Ukraine Intervention

#### Perm do both – CP isn’t mutually exclusive to the aff

#### Ukraine is already a zone for potential nuclear or even chemical escalation – intervention guarantees escalation

Malcolm Davis, 5-4-2022, "Will Putin go nuclear to avoid defeat in Ukraine?," Strategist, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/will-putin-go-nuclear-to-avoid-defeat-in-ukraine/> GH-PJ

In 2022 the world faces a new nuclear threat, with the risk that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine could turn into a wider war between NATO and Moscow that escalates past the nuclear threshold or, alternatively, Russia’s use of a [tactical nuclear weapon](https://dc.medill.northwestern.edu/blog/2018/02/09/exactly-low-yield-nuclear-weapon/#sthash.NpMxbirP.dpbs) in Ukraine. CIA Director William Burns [said](https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-nuclear-weapons-burns-cia/31804539.html) on 14 April: ‘Given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership, given the setbacks that they’ve faced so far, militarily, none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons.’ A Russian defeat at the conventional military level would increase the likelihood of Putin going nuclear, perhaps as part of a [strategy](https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russian-military-doctrine-calls-a-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation-heres-why/) of ‘escalate to de-escalate’ in which a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon is detonated in Ukraine. Such a move would either seek to turn the tide of battle or serve as a warning shot to Kyiv and NATO to accept Russia’s terms for ending the war. It’s also possible that Russia could decide to escalate at a conventional level by extending its attacks beyond Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov [has accused](https://www.reuters.com/world/response-lavrov-comments-us-says-talk-nuclear-escalation-is-irresponsible-2022-04-26/) NATO of engaging in a proxy war and said that weapons shipments are legitimate targets. And Russia is already making implied threats of [extending the war](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/26/moldova-ukraine-war-putin-russia/) to the disputed Transnistria region of [Moldova](https://olgalautman.substack.com/p/russia-sets-their-eye-on-moldova?r=k8nwv&s=w&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web). That would dramatically increase the threat to Romania, a NATO member, and destabilise the Moldovan state, many of whose residents are ethnically Romanian. Perhaps most worryingly, Putin recently doubled down on the nuclear rhetoric with an [implicit threat](https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Ukraine-war/Ukraine-war-Free-to-read/Ukraine-from-April-12-to-April-28-Putin-warns-West-of-lightning-fast-retaliation): If someone intends to intervene in the ongoing events from the outside and create strategic threats for Russia that are unacceptable to us, they should know that our retaliatory strikes will be lightning-fast. We have all the tools for this, things no one else can boast of having now. And we will not boast—we will use them if necessary. And I want everyone to know that. With the West expanding its assistance to Ukraine, the possibility that Putin could interpret it as intervention generates another pathway to escalation. It’s not clear how NATO would respond to the use of a low-yield nuclear weapon in Ukraine—or, for that matter, large-scale use of chemical weapons against Ukrainian targets. The chemical weapons scenario is perhaps more likely, given that norms of non-use of chemical weapons have already been eroded by Syria’s large-scale use of a range of them against its own people in 2014. Use of such weapons by Russia might simply attract intensified sanctions and political condemnation. Tactical nuclear use would be a different matter altogether. Use of a nuclear weapon—even a low-yield tactical weapon—would represent a fundamental shift in global security. It would shatter the norm of non-use of nuclear weapons, and absent an effective response by NATO, would usher in a new era in which states would perceive such weapons as credible options for warfighting, not just for deterrence. Other nuclear-armed states might move to prioritise low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, and non-nuclear states that had nuclear ambitions, such as Iran, might decide that participating in non-proliferation and arms control is no longer a priority. Negotiations on restoring the nuclear deal with Iran could become a casualty of nuclear escalation in Ukraine and North Korea is already well into [developing](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/04/26/asia-pacific/north-korea-parade-kim-nuclear/) a range of new tactical nuclear forces. Of course, not responding—or responding weakly, such as with intensified economic sanctions and political condemnation—isn’t the only option open to NATO in the event Russia uses a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. Direct military intervention at a conventional level, to strike at Russian nuclear-capable delivery systems, would be one option; another would be deployment of NATO forces on the ground to directly support Ukrainian forces in battle. But any direct military intervention by NATO, even below the nuclear threshold, would almost inevitably lead to a wider NATO–Russia war, and with it, the near certainty of nuclear escalation. It’s that spectre of nuclear war—as opposed to a single detonation—that constrains NATO’s responses, even in the face of Russian atrocities in Bucha and Kramatorsk. In particular, the prospect of such a war escalating to strategic nuclear exchanges and devastating the planet will be in the minds of NATO decisionmakers.

## AT: Nuclear Fail-safe

#### Perm do both – CP isn’t mutually exclusive to the aff

#### China and the US can’t cooperate

Evan A. Feigenbaum, 4-28-2020, "Why the United States and China Forgot How to Cooperate," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/28/why-united-states-and-china-forgot-how-to-cooperate-pub-81673> GH-PJ

Governments, regimes, and leaders do not act against their self-defined interest. The financial crisis provides an ideal example because before he was treasury secretary, Paulson had worked closely with Chinese leaders for decades, including as the chairman and chief executive of Goldman Sachs. But even he couldn’t get the Chinese to do some things during the 2008 crisis. At the end of the day, U.S. and Chinese actions are dictated by U.S. and Chinese interests. And it requires incredibly hard work by people with vision, persistence, and a sense of the moment to produce cooperation. There is no magic wand to induce altruistic joint action. But it is hard to solve real problems that affect real people the world over when the two most significant actors in the international system not only are not coordinating but are actually working at cross purposes, even if they are doing so for their own purposes. The question facing the international system is whether and how the countries, governments, and peoples affected by what happens between Beijing and Washington can get those two to coordinate on things that really matter to the entire world. Or to put that a little bit differently, what does the rest of the world do if no crisis is truly big enough anymore to elicit even modest cooperation between Beijing and Washington? The world surely won’t be better off. And past episodes of coordination and cooperation demonstrate how it can sometimes be made better.

#### North Korea wants more nukes to use against the US, South Korea, and Japan

Abigail Ng, 4-18-2022, “North Korea is committed to an ‘alarming change’ in its nuclear policy, professor says,” CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/19/north-korea-is-committed-to-an-alarming-change-in-nuclear-policy-professor.html> GH-PJ

North Korea ultimately wants to have more nuclear weapons to use against the U.S. troops in South Korea and Japan in the event of an invasion, according to a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. North Korea currently has the ability to use a small number of nuclear weapons against the United States, said Jeffrey Lewis, a professor on arms control. “They have some deterrence, but what I think the North Koreans really, fundamentally want is the ability to use a much larger number of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan if they thought an invasion was underway,” he told CNBC’s [“Squawk Box Asia”](https://www.cnbc.com/asia-squawk-box/) on Monday. “This is part of [an] … alarming change in the way they approach nuclear weapons, and that change is really to give themselves the ability to use nuclear weapons first if they think they are about to be invaded,” he said. His comments came after [North Korea conducted another missile test on Sunday](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/17/north-korean-leader-kim-observes-missile-test-to-boost-nuclear-capabilities-.html). State news agency KCNA reported that Kim “gave important instructions on further building up the defense capabilities and nuclear combat forces of the country.” “North Koreans are really committed to shifting their nuclear policy,” according to Lewis. He said the missile looked like “yet another variant” of a short-range one and that it’s “more of the same” from North Korea — but it’s “still quite unwelcome.” According to Lewis, North Korea is now working toward a nuclear weapons test, more than four years since its last one in 2017. “In a sense, the gloves are off,” he said. “They don’t really feel bound by any of the commitments they made in 2018 when the diplomacy period started, and we’re also seeing a lot of activity at the nuclear test site.” During his presidency, U.S. President [Donald Trump](https://www.cnbc.com/donald-trump/) held two summits with Kim to [discuss denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/12/trump-and-kim-sign-agreement-document-after-summit-in-singapore.html) The second one, in Hanoi, ended abruptly when the [two sides were unable to agree on the removal of sanctions.](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/28/white-house-trump-kim-meetings-change-of-schedule.html) North Korea closed the entrances to its nuclear test tunnels in 2018, but they have likely already reopened them, Lewis said. Satellite images taken in March showed [construction at the site where North Korea has conducted all its previous nuclear tests](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nkorea-appears-be-restoring-its-dismantled-nuclear-test-site-2022-03-15/), Reuters reported. It’s now up Kim to decide when he wants to test a nuclear weapon, the professor said. “If we know one thing, we know that there’s going to be a nuclear test when Kim Jong Un feels like it,” he added.

## AT: CAFOs

#### Perm do both – CP isn’t mutually exclusive to the aff

#### Modern agriculture is sustainable

FAIR No Date "Modern Agriculture is Sustainable Agriculture," Farmers Alliance for Integrated Resources, <http://www.faircolorado.org/modern-agriculture-is-sustainable-agriculture/> GH-PJ

Advances in modern agriculture allow today’s farmers to grow in ways that are measurably more sustainable. These practices help farmers retain topsoil and reduce erosion, conserve water in multiple ways, reduce emissions, protect pollinators, and protect natural resources by using farmland more efficiently. Modern agricultural practices, including crop rotation, keep crops healthy. Without them, the farmers’ crops would be more vulnerable to pests, diseases, and invasive weeds. The sustainability benefits of modern agriculture are supported by local data collected by Boulder County. The paper linked below contains data collected from a variety of Boulder County farmers. It clearly demonstrates that farming techniques that utilize GMO seeds and responsible pesticide use produce better environmental results compared to conventional or organic farming methods. This includes factors that affect climate change. Continuing support for these modern agricultural practices is in keeping with Boulder County’s sustainability goals. [Implications of cropping systems in Boulder County](http://www.faircolorado.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Implications-of-cropping-systems-in-Boulder-County-CSU.pdf) Pollinators are an essential part of food productions – and our farmers know it! That’s why farmers are invested in growing food in ways that protect pollinator populations.

## AT: Smart Grid

#### Perm do both – CP isn’t mutually exclusive to the aff

#### **Smart Grids are incredibly vulnerable to cyberattacks – especially Denial of Service attacks**

Faquir et. al. 21 [Dharmesh Faquir](javascript:void(0);), [Nestoras Chouliaras](javascript:void(0);) , [Vlachou Sofia](javascript:void(0);) , [Kalopoulou Olga](javascript:void(0);), [Leandros Maglaras](javascript:void(0);) Published: 12 January 2021, "Cybersecurity in smart grids, challenges and solutions," AIMS Electronics and Electrical Engineering, <https://www.aimspress.com/article/doi/10.3934/electreng.2021002?viewType=HTML> GH-PJ

Smart Grids are better than traditional legacy power grids in terms of competency and productivity as the Smart Grids are environmentally friendly, it uses a lot of renewable sources of energy and foremost it is more secure than the traditional power grid. Furthermore, the research suggested possible benefits and vulnerability against the Smart Grid. The benefits of using a Smart Grid in the overall perspective, it will provide a wider range of security with having various techniques and techniques to overcome some of the cyber-attack issues. However, while conducting the research, the various paper has suggested the security benefits and vulnerability related Smart Grids, almost every research paper suggested that threatening weakness for Smart Grids would be the Denial-of-Service attack. Since Smart Grids are the construction of the network and attacking the network would cripple the Smart Grid. Although, the Smart Grid will protect the Availability of the service with multiple layers of security an optimal solution for the security aspects would be using the Virtual Private Network (VPN) for more secure communication. Moreover, concluding this research, self-awareness related to cyber-attack in Smart Grids is important. The user should be aware of the risks related to the Smart Grid and mitigate them by doing various risk assessments and case studies to provide a further solution in protecting the Smart Grid against different types of cyber-attack. Additionally, the research addressed possible challenges related to the Smart Grid. The Smart Grids challenges are that various devices connected over vast geographical area networks. The biggest challenge to secure these devices over larger infrastructure. Blockchain technology could help resolve security issues by providing a shared and encrypted ledger that is immutable to changes made by malicious nodes or attackers. It can also be utilized to verify identities and authorize access by storing and recording transactions in the immutable ledger and make data exchanges between distributed gadgets smooth and cost-efficient. In conclusion, the computer network protocols need to be modified according to the current posture of communication as well as providing sophisticated encryption methods and to offer security countermeasures. Therefore, it will provide defense against evolved cyber-attacks.

## AT: Collision Warning System

#### Perm do both – CP isn’t mutually exclusive to the aff

#### OADR is already in development and will be operational by 2025– space tracking services already exist – read green

Rahul Rao, 2-21-2022, "Avoiding satellite collisions: NOAA unveils prototype warning system," Space, <https://www.space.com/noaa-satellite-collision-warning-system-prototype> Rahul Rao is a graduate of New York University's SHERP and a freelance science writer, regularly covering physics, space, and infrastructure. He holds a master’s degree in science writing from New York University's Science, Health and Environmental Reporting Program (SHERP) and earned a bachelors degree from Vanderbilt University, where he studied English and physics. GH-PJ

A new collision-warning system could help satellite operators sleep a little easier. The prototype system, developed by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), is designed to alert operators when their spacecraft may be on a collision course with another object. That's a real and growing concern, given how [crowded Earth orbit is becoming](https://www.space.com/space-junk-threat-satellites-guidelines-reduce-orbital-debris.html). The system, which was demonstrated in a [webcast press conference](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XAJE7VpOelo) on Feb. 11, is called the Open-Architecture Data Repository (OADR). It's a cloud database that keeps tabs on the growing population in [Earth](https://www.space.com/54-earth-history-composition-and-atmosphere.html) orbit and warns if there's a danger of a collision, just as you might get a weather warning if you're in the path of a storm. It works like this: The OADR collects data on space conditions from a number of different scans from ground sensors that together cover much of the globe. The OADR is linked both to US-government-affiliated ground stations and to a network of commercial stations (especially in the Southern Hemisphere). The data also includes [space weather](https://www.space.com/space-weather) observations and other satellites' live telemetry and maneuvering plans. The OADR takes in all that data and creates a picture of the orbital environment, which it then uses to assess if there are any looming "conjunctions" — close encounters between orbiting objects. If there are any, the OADR can relay that data back to satellite operators as a sort of weather forecast, giving them (ideally) several days to move their satellite out of the way. "A hurricane notification displays a probability cone that continually changes as new data is obtained," Scott Leonard, Special Advisor to the Director of NOAA's Office of Space Commerce, said in the Feb. 11 press conference. "A conjunction is similar." OADR is still under development; the newly unveiled system is a prototype. According to Leonard, the OADR team still needs to iron out some kinks with automating data collection and prediction processes. If all goes according to plan, the OADR will see initial public operation by 2024 and be fully operational by 2025. There are already a number of commercial firms providing these sorts of space-tracking services, but the OADR's creators hope that it will ultimately have more data than those services — and better predictive capabilities to boot. It's hardly a secret that Earth orbit is getting quite crowded. There are already [at least 23,000 objects](https://www.space.com/space-junk-growing-problem-complicated-solution) in space with a diameter of 4 inches (10 centimeters) or greater. That number really began to explode in the 21st century, and it isn't slowing down. “We expect on the order of 57,000 new satellites by the year 2030," Stephen Volz, assistant secretary of commerce for environmental observation at NOAA, said in the press conference. And in-space collisions aren't just the stuff of nightmare fantasy. Last year, for example, a [Chinese military satellite collided](https://www.space.com/space-junk-collision-chinese-satellite-yunhai-1-02) with a piece of a 25-year-old Russian rocket. The satellites of SpaceX's Starlink broadband constellation, which may someday consist of more than 40,000 spacecraft, seem to be [a particular cause for alerts](https://www.space.com/spacex-starlink-satellite-collision-alerts-on-the-rise). In its stewards' eyes, the OADR is intended to preemptively keep track of all the biggest threats. But it will likely be some time before any system can keep track of the [millions of tiny objects](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers) in orbit — everything from rubbish to shards of metal to flecks of paint — all of which can cause catastrophic damage, given how fast everything moves up there.

#### This doesn’t mean our impacts will be solved for by OADR in 2025 – our impact still stand because OADR doesn’t account for attacks on satellites – OADR is just a warning system

## AT: Reforestation

#### Perm do both – CP isn’t mutually exclusive to the aff

#### Reforestation isn’t a silver bullet – we need to stop emitting first

Michael Marshall, 26th May 2020, "Planting trees doesn’t always help with climate change," British Broadcasting Company, <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200521-planting-trees-doesnt-always-help-with-climate-change> GH-PJ

Protecting existing forests and planting new ones are surely good things to do. However, scientists say we must not place too much faith in trees to save us. In particular, last year one research group claimed we can plant a trillion extra trees and [remove a quarter of the carbon dioxide currently in the air](https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aax0848). These figures have been widely criticised as overhyped and unreliable. Trees will definitely help us slow climate change, but they won’t reverse it on their own. The underlying problem is that our society is releasing greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide (CO2), that are warming the Earth’s climate to levels we have never experienced before. As a result the great ice sheets are melting, contributing to rising seas, and extreme weather events like hurricanes and droughts are becoming more severe. The solution is to stop emitting all greenhouse gases, for instance by replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy sources like solar power. Deforestation is actually one of the biggest sources of carbon dioxide, because when trees are cut down much of the carbon stored within them escapes into the air – especially if the wood is burned. For instance, in 2017 land use changes – mostly deforestation – contributed [four billion tonnes of CO2](https://www.newscientist.com/article/2152929-bad-news-carbon-emissions-have-suddenly-started-rising-again/) emissions to [the global total of 41 billion tonnes of CO2](https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-10-2141-2018). In other words, if we stopped cutting down trees we would cut our annual emissions by about 10%.

#### Their author admitted that their study is incorrect

Michael Marshall, 26th May 2020, "Planting trees doesn’t always help with climate change," British Broadcasting Company, <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200521-planting-trees-doesnt-always-help-with-climate-change> GH-PJ

By some estimates, trees can be an enormous carbon sink. A study published in July 2019, led by [Thomas Crowther](https://usys.ethz.ch/en/people/profile.tom-crowther.html) of ETH-Zurich in Switzerland, estimated the world has room for [an extra 0.9 billion hectares of forest](https://ethz.ch/en/news-and-events/eth-news/news/2019/07/how-trees-could-save-the-climate.html). [Once those trees had matured](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-48870920), they could store 752 billion tonnes of CO2. Planting trees, the team wrote, is “[one of the most effective carbon drawdown solutions to date](https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aax0848)”. This finding has had immediate, fierce pushback from other climate scientists. In October 2019, the journal Science published [four](https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaz0388) [highly](https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aay8060) [critical](https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aay7976) [comments](https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aay8334). These argued that the researchers had overestimated the carbon trees could store – by a factor of five. They also highlighted multiple mistakes. For instance, much of the land Crowther described as “available” for tree planting already has plants growing on it, all of them storing carbon, many of which would have to be removed, according to [Sonia Seneviratne](https://iac.ethz.ch/people-iac/person-detail.html?persid=54778) of ETH-Zurich and her colleagues. The criticism hit home and, in May 2020, [Crowther's team published an extensive correction](https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abc8905), in which they admitted that some of their headline claims were "incorrect" and that the data contained "errors".

## AT: Hotlines

#### Hotlines fail – Pakistan and India prove

Muhammad W. Haider & Tahir M. Azad 8-3-21 Azad: King’s College London Haider: National Defence University Lancaster University [THE ROLE OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE EVOLUTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222>] // DHS WAgustin 🛏

Pakistan and India have engaged in military and nuclear CBMs on numerous occasions, despite non-cordial relations. The first step in the military CBMs was the establishment of a hotline between the militaries in 1971 following the model of the United States’ and USSR's military communications in the same timeframe ([Ahmar 2001](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222), 87). However, the hotline between the Director Generals of Military Operations of both countries remained symbolic, and no practical advantages were effectively achieved for maintaining peaceful relations. The hotline works well during peacetime while it gets suspended during crises build-ups, rendering it, in essence, useless. The sitting prime ministers of both countries, Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi, signed the next major CBM under the umbrella of the Nuclear Threat Initiatives. This CBM aimed to prevent attacks on each other's nuclear facilities but does not provide any prevention against foreign allies attacking such installations. This measure enabled the exchange of a list of nuclear facilities between both the countries in 1992 (Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan [1992](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)) which helped to build trust and both the nuclear rivals respected the arrangements during the peace as well as during times of increased crisis. In 1991, Pakistan and India's CBMs progressed further as they signed an agreement for prior notification regarding military exercises and air space violations, especially near the LoC. This set of CBMs opened further channels of communication in the military and diplomatic domains to avoid the repetition of earlier crises but it could not achieve the desired results owing to the non-availability of implementation structures. The next CBM milestone was the 1992 agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons—both countries declared that they do not possess any chemical weapons. However, these CBMs suffered a considerable setback once India declared its chemical weapons arsenal under the Chemical Weapons Convention ([Nuclear Threat Initiative 2011a](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)). Such incidents created further suspicion between both countries—which were already having problematic relations—and halted the advancement in the process of confidence building. Pakistan considered the incident as a violation of the bilateral agreement which widened the gulf in trust deficit between the two countries. In the wake of this incident, no further progress was achieved until 1999. Later, Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee concluded the Lahore Accord in 1999, which was a milestone agreement for peacebuilding following the nuclear tests in 1998. This agreement incorporated the concept of developing and employing CBMs in both the conventional military and nuclear domains to avoid any untoward nuclear weapons launch situations and to reduce the prospects for future conflicts ([Nuclear Threat Initiative 2011b](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)). Unfortunately, this set of CBMs was undermined by the Kargil Conflict, which started a few months after the declaration. This time it was the Pakistani side that undermined the peace efforts as political and military leaderships were not on the same page. Here the political leadership tried to put some mechanisms in place for peaceful coexistence, but the military institution spoiled these efforts. This problem necessitates the requirement of structures that can implement and sustain CBMs without significant interference from any state institution, military in particular. From 1999 to 2003, tensions remained high between both the states due to large-scale deployments along the LoC, plus terrorist attacks in Srinagar and on the Indian parliament. The UN General Assembly session of 2003 carved out a route toward a ceasefire and later on to direct negotiations between the political leadership of both countries ([Khawaja 2018](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222), 120–121). A new set of military and nuclear CBMs was then worked upon which included the reduction of troops along the LoC, no further development of military posts, and prior information regarding the testing of ballistic missiles ([Krepon 2017](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)). The composite dialogue process constituted a major step forward which aimed to resolve the issues between both countries through a strategy that satisfies the demands of both countries ([Padder 2012](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)). This dialogue process provided the opportunity to discuss the peace process through a diverse range of domains including the Kashmir issue. However, all these CBMs halted in 2008 ([Gul 2007](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)) after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai for which India blamed Pakistan. Later, very few efforts were initiated in 2014 and 2015, but those did not work due to pre-existing notions of trust deficit and further accusations of terrorist attacks. The primary issues in the implementation of the military and nuclear CBMs are the non-availability of a framework, transparency issues, and lack of trust. Political aspects will also play a significant role in the success of any military and nuclear CBMs, yet military and security concerns continue to undermine political will between these two states. While Pakistan and India are so-called democratic countries, they do not have liberal democratic structures and the separation of powers remains a contentious issue. Additionally, the policies adopted through CBMs proved to be thoroughly incompatible with follow-up actions because the military and political leadership in both countries remained suspicious of each other. These issues obstructed the implementation of military and nuclear CBMs in both letter and spirit. The recurring crises between Pakistan and India after the Pulwama attacks of 2019 highlight the shortfalls of the concept of nuclear deterrence between both South Asian neighbors. Cyberspace also provides a new domain for waging wars and there are no existing agreements between Pakistan and India in this domain. A cyber-attack may prove disastrous in provoking an unintentional war in the region ([Yamin 2019](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)).

## AT: Russian Sanctions

#### Sanctions fail – They hurt the people NOT the military or leaders

Rami Al-Khalifa Al-Ali 6-5-22 Writer for Saudi Gazette [The failure of Western sanctions against Russia, <https://www.zawya.com/en/world/uk-and-europe/the-failure-of-western-sanctions-against-russia-gycrd12k>] //DHS WAgustin

Historically, sanctions have failed to achieve any political goals. It is the worst weapon that the modern and contemporary international system has produced. Every time when sanctions were imposed, it was the people who paid the price, while these sanctions failed to harm the leaders and officials in the targeted countries. With the beginning of the Russian war on Ukraine, a series of Western sanctions are being slapped on the Russian side, and that has covered almost all fields. This is up to the extent that one of the Western universities canceled a lecture on Tolstoy on the pretext that he was a Russian! The Western nations wished that their sanctions would be so crushing and thus deal a fatal blow to the Russian economy, and hence they have frozen Russian deposits as well as Russian assets abroad, leaving no room for the Western hand to reach unless it was punished. The worst scenario was the attempt to isolate Russia from the global banking payment system called SWIFT (The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) as this makes import and export a very complicated affair even though it would be possible. The Russian economy absorbed the first blow, despite the sagging ruble, but it quickly recovered, and even achieved higher gains than before the war. The obvious question that must be asked by Western circles: what is the purpose of these sanctions? The answer, as presented by Western politicians, is twofold: the first is the weakening of the Russian economy, which affects the stability of the Putin government and undermines confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin on the Russian street. However, the results of these sanctions were counterproductive and the proportion of opponents of the war is very small on the Russian street, and President Putin’s popularity is on the rise. The second aspect is the effect on the Russian war machine. It is true that there were many difficulties experienced by the Russian forces, especially in the beginning of the war, and the failure to capture Kiev, and this forced the Russian leadership to change its military plans. But this has nothing to do with the Western sanctions. Rather, the armed forces, like the Russian economy, have regained their solidity and seemed more capable of achieving breakthroughs and steady military progress. This does not mean victory in the war, but it means that the Russian forces were not affected by the aforesaid sanctions. The Western sanctions on Russia made the supply of Ukrainian grain a very difficult issue, even if it was done in relatively small quantities, and Russia's isolation from the SWIFT regime made the supply of Russian grain no less difficult. If we know that both countries export 30 percent of the grain worldwide, it can be understood that the food crisis that the world is beginning to suffer from, and which threatens impending famines that might afflict a large number of the third world countries, even though these countries have no part in the Ukrainian war or in the conflict between the West and Russia. The worst is that the European societies themselves have begun to suffer from the rise in the prices of essential goods, as the prices of fuels increased by up to 40 percent, and this led to a rise in most essential goods, especially foodstuffs. After the experience of the past months, the Western sanctions on Russia are like those who shoot themselves in the feet. In fact, Moscow has benefited from sanctions on the energy sector. What it was unable to export was compensated by the rise in oil prices. It is clear that the West must change its strategy, and this can only be done by bitterly admitting that it has failed miserably in its policy of imposing sanctions against Russia.

## AT: China Tech Coop

#### China says no – US and China are locked in a stalemate

Sam Bresnick & Paul Haenle 2-21-22 Sam Bresnick is assistant editor and senior research analyst Paul Haenle holds the Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He served as the White House China director on the National Security Council staffs of former presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. [Why U.S.-China Relations Are Locked in a Stalemate, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/21/why-u.s.-china-relations-are-locked-in-stalemate-pub-86478>] // DHS WAgustin 🍞

Fifty years ago this week, former U.S. President Richard Nixon flew to China, setting the stage for a dramatic shift in relations between the two countries. Much has changed since that visit, not always for the better. Despite a flurry of diplomatic activity over the past year, U.S.-China ties remain tense. Discussions in [Alaska](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56452471) and [Tianjin](https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-shermans-visit-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/) yielded few, if any, breakthroughs. While friendlier in tone, the recent summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden led only to [agreements](https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/17/xi-biden-summit-us-china-policy/) to hold yet more talks, albeit on important issues such as strategic stability. The lone bilateral bright spot has been some cooperation on [climate](https://www.state.gov/u-s-china-joint-glasgow-declaration-on-enhancing-climate-action-in-the-2020s/). Since the summit, the Biden administration [announced](https://www.npr.org/2021/12/07/1062016949/president-biden-announces-a-diplomatic-boycott-of-the-being-winter-olympics) its diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics and [added](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/17/2021-27406/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-an-entry-on-the-entity-list) more Chinese companies to its trade restriction list while Congress passed a [bill](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-passes-bill-targeting-china-over-uyghur-forced-labor-n1286160) aimed at countering China’s forced labor abuses in Xinjiang. The two sides’ antagonistic stances on issues related to security, economics, technology, and ideology have largely crystalized, leaving little space for the adjustments that could relieve simmering tensions. Below, Paul Haenle and Sam Bresnick analyze how the two countries got here and how they can move forward. WHY ARE THE TWO SIDES STUCK? Former U.S. President Donald Trump ushered in a more confrontational era in U.S.-China relations, and Biden has largely maintained his predecessor’s approach to Beijing, albeit with a more equanimous tone and embrace of multilateralism. The U.S. government has for decades been concerned by China’s mercantilism, rapid military modernization, and illiberal approach to human rights, but it had held out hope that China might liberalize through increasingly robust contact with the rest of the world. That has not happened, and the United States and others have lost patience with China’s state capitalist system, militarization of the South China Sea, and increasingly [authoritarian governance](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/china-hong-kong-security-law.html). But Beijing is not backing down. Despite facing pronounced international pushback during the pandemic, Xi has become even more confident in China’s economic system, governance model, and approach to international affairs. “Time and momentum are on China’s side,” he [argued](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3117314/xi-jinping-says-time-and-momentum-chinas-side-he-sets-out) last year at a high-level meeting, though many analysts accuse the party of [overconfidence](https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-From-leader-to-students-overconfidence-clouds-China). At the same time, Chinese officials are increasingly looking askance at their U.S. counterparts. Many appear to believe that the United States, though still a formidable power, is in the early stages of an [inevitable decline](https://www.economist.com/china/2021/03/31/china-is-betting-that-the-west-is-in-irreversible-decline). Just as China resumes its rightful place atop the hierarchy of Asian nations, Beijing’s thinking goes, the United States’ unresolved racial justice issues, income inequality, and political polarization will catalyze an irreversible diminution of U.S. power in Asia and across the globe. Complicating matters further, the U.S. and Chinese publics are increasingly distrustful of each other. A whopping 89 percent of American respondents to a recent [survey](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/03/04/most-americans-support-tough-stance-toward-china-on-human-rights-economic-issues/) from the Pew Research Center consider China a competitor or enemy, while around [two-thirds](https://uscnpm.org/the-pulse/) of Chinese respondents view the United States unfavorably or very unfavorably. Such negative mutual perceptions would likely hamper each side’s ability to recalibrate its approach to the other. Finally, the two sides’ divergent framings of the relationship are contributing to the ongoing [stalemate](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202107/t20210726_9134602.html). Discussions with high-level Chinese scholars and former government officials have revealed that Beijing prefers to define the bilateral relationship as a peaceful coexistence guided by shared principles, consensus, and possible cooperation. China is frustrated that the United States is more focused on competing with and confronting Beijing. In Washington, however, great power rivalry, defined more by competition and confrontation than cooperation, has become the central framework for bilateral ties. HOW HAVE THESE DIFFERING VIEWS AFFECTED POLICYMAKING? The pronounced turn in U.S. policy toward China, beginning with the Trump administration, has not led to self-reflection on the part of Beijing. Chinese scholars and experts initially appeared somewhat [surprised](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/world/asia/china-trade-war-trump.html) that many of the economic, security, and technology policies that Beijing has pursued for years have recently precipitated robust policy responses from the United States. The ruling party believes that it is merely continuing down the same path it established some years back, which has led to its attributing the downturn in the bilateral relationship solely to the United States. Chinese government officials appear to believe the United States’ goal is to “[suppress](https://news.cgtn.com/news/3245444e77554464776c6d636a4e6e62684a4856/index.html)” China’s rise. They [cite](https://www.economist.com/china/2021/09/25/china-believes-that-america-is-forging-alliances-to-stop-its-rise) the Trump administration’s [policies](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213441.shtml), as well as Biden’s [AUKUS submarine pact](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3151700/aukus-alliance-what-it-what-does-it-have-do-china-and-why) and the Quad’s [increasing coordination](https://www.npr.org/2021/03/11/975469203/quad-summit-biden-looks-to-boost-coordination-against-china), as evidence of Washington’s desire to [contain](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1246562.shtml) China and limit Beijing’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, many Chinese scholars and experts view U.S. restrictions on sensitive technology exports to China as [proof](https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3164367/china-must-brace-digital-cold-war-us-battle-tech-supremacy) that the United States seeks to hamper its burgeoning tech sector. Finally, they [see](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1220502.shtml)U.S. complaints about human rights violations in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet as disingenuous, given the United States’ own problems with racial justice and homelessness, as well as its high levels of wealth and income inequality. In short, China sees the United States as a declining power that is attempting to keep a rising China from overtaking it. The United States, as expected, has a very different view of bilateral dynamics. Washington blames the downturn in relations on China’s increasing assertiveness abroad and repressiveness at home. U.S. officials are concerned that China, through its support of authoritarian regimes, is chipping away at the liberal international order and trying to create “[a world safe for autocracy](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-06-11/world-safe-autocracy)”; that its continued military modernization and interest in building bases in [Cambodia](https://amti.csis.org/changes-underway-at-cambodias-ream-naval-base/), [Equatorial Guinea](https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-first-military-base-on-africas-atlantic-coast-u-s-intelligence-finds-11638726327), and the [United Arab Emirates](https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=dubai+chinese+military+bas) will allow Beijing to challenge Washington’s security primacy; and that its state capitalist, mercantilist system threatens the rules-based economic order. Beijing’s incarceration of around [1 million Uighurs and other Muslim minorities](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang) in Xinjiang, increasingly strict online censorship, and prosecution of dissidents have further fueled Washington’s desire to enact more aggressive responses. WHAT DOES EACH SIDE WANT OUT OF THE RELATIONSHIP? Our conversations have revealed that China wants the United States to afford it the space it believes it deserves as a rising power, at least in its own backyard. Beijing, as the preeminent Asian security and economic actor, sees the United States’ military presence in East and Southeast Asia as inherently threatening. Moreover, it hopes that Washington will ease pressure, especially regarding economics and technology, as well as refrain from engaging in ideological competition in service of impugning Beijing’s governance model and human rights record. But perhaps China’s most significant wish is for the United States to acknowledge the legitimacy of its economic and political systems. Given that the United States views China’s economic and political practices as antithetical to its own, as well as to those of countries acting within a healthy, properly functioning international system, Washington is unlikely to refrain from impeaching Chinese authoritarianism, mercantilism, and treatment of ethnic minorities and dissidents. The United States’ tougher policies and more confrontational approach are meant to push back on and defend against a range of Chinese domestic and foreign practices that threaten to undermine the international rules and norms that have been in place since the end of World War II, as well as raise the costs for China to revise that very order. In general, Washington would prefer that Beijing dial back or eliminate its economic and innovation mercantilism, respect other countries’ sovereignties, agree to peacefully resolve disputes, and abide by international agreements on human rights. HOW CAN THE TWO SIDES RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES? Biden has opted to use a calmer, more restrained tone with Beijing than did his predecessor, with the aim of avoiding escalation. Moreover, unlike some Trump administration [officials](https://www.wsj.com/articles/secretary-of-state-pompeo-to-urge-chinese-people-to-change-the-communist-party-11595517729), Biden’s team has made it clear that Washington is not seeking regime change in China. And though Biden [criticized](https://www.cfr.org/election2020/candidate-tracker) Trump’s lack of a clear set of goals or a coherent interagency policy framework for addressing the China challenge, his administration has yet to release its long-awaited [China strategy](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-01-14/washingtons-missing-china-strategy) (though China does figure prominently in its recently issued [Indo-Pacific Strategy](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf)). Until that document is issued, the finer points of the administration’s plans to compete with Beijing, as well as the end goal of such competition, will remain fuzzy. A clear articulation of U.S. aims would be helpful in Washington’s efforts to secure greater international cooperation from allies and partners in addressing the challenges China poses. It would also provide Chinese and U.S. leaders a starting point from which to negotiate the future of bilateral ties. In China, there is considerable room for greater self-reflection. Chinese leaders should closely examine how Beijing’s own aggressive diplomacy, economic statecraft, military buildup, and human rights violations have alarmed and unsettled the United States and many other countries, especially those in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Across many conversations, few, if any, Chinese experts have acknowledged that Beijing’s actions have played a role in the cratering of U.S.-China relations. Furthermore, they are reluctant to acknowledge that numerous nations’ hardening stances toward China are driven by China’s activities rather than U.S. coercion. Acknowledging its agency in harming relations, as well as its ability to take proactive steps to put U.S.-China ties on better footing, would constitute important initial gestures by the Chinese side. Moreover, China’s willingness to take more responsibility for its own actions and modify its policy and rhetoric would go a long way toward stabilizing bilateral dynamics. There is no doubt the U.S.-China relationship will remain competitive going forward. Preventing bilateral ties from becoming even more hostile and adversarial, however, should constitute a common aim for both countries. Biden understands this, as he stressed the importance of developing guardrails and establishing strategic stability talks between the two governments [during his virtual summit](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/16/readout-of-president-bidens-virtual-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/) with Xi. Implementing robust crisis management mechanisms would also prove a useful step in augmenting both nations’ abilities to control escalation in the event of a military incident in the increasingly crowded waters and air space off of China’s eastern and southern coasts. Washington and Beijing also should establish an effective problem-solving mode for the bilateral relationship. Many observers stress the importance of U.S.-China cooperation on transnational issues where the two sides have common interests—[climate change](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2021/10/28/rebuilding-us-chinese-cooperation-on-climate-change-the-science-and-technology-opportunity/), [nuclear nonproliferation](https://www.brookings.edu/research/revitalizing-nonproliferation-cooperation-with-russia-and-china/), and [global health](https://www.csis.org/analysis/advancing-us-china-health-security-cooperation-era-strategic-competition), among others. These efforts are certainly important, but they are quite ambitious and often hampered by Washington’s and Beijing’s different approaches to managing international issues. The two countries have thus far failed to make progress in most areas. That does not mean they should abandon these efforts. But perhaps the United States and China should devote more energy toward trying to create a problem-solving approach for addressing more pointed irritants, such as limits on journalist visas and consulate closures. Such a method has already yielded dividends regarding the [former issue](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/16/us/politics/us-china-journalists.html). The two countries should focus on how to build on those smaller successes to work through larger problems in other areas. By committing to this pragmatic approach, the United States and China may be able to find a way to put a floor under deteriorating relations, begin to build goodwill, and lay the foundation for taking on the larger structural issues in areas, like trade and technology, that will be key to determining the future health and welfare of the U.S.-China relationship over the long term. Despite the two nations’ differing mindsets and approaches to bilateral ties, starting small could prove the best method through which to, eventually, realize large gains.

## AT: Russian Aggression

### 2AC – US Says no

#### US says no – it can’t afford to ban Russia from SWIFT – economy shock spills over into the US AND sanctions incite dedollarization

Hirsh Chitkara 22 [Hirsh Chitkara, 2-22-2022, "The US won’t sanction Russia on SWIFT," Protocol, https://www.protocol.com/policy/russia-swift-sanctions-ukraine, smarx, HHW]

“We in Germany are prepared to pay a high price economically — that’s why everything is on the table,” German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said on Friday.

“These are some of the greatest sanctions, if not the strongest that we’ve ever issued,” Vice President Kamala Harris reiterated at the Munich Security Conference over the weekend. “It is directed at institutions — in particular, financial institutions — and individuals, and it will exact absolute harm for the Russian economy.”

Yet for all the aggressive posturing, the U.S. coalition has seemingly backtracked on SWIFT, deciding not to block Russian access to the international payments communication system. Pundits have come to refer to SWIFT sanctions as “the nuclear option.” But some policy experts say this characterization is wildly overstated, arguing instead that SWIFT sanctions wouldn’t be nearly as effective as those directly targeting Russian banks.

So why are sanctions against Russian banks still on the table, while cutting off SWIFT access has been deemed a step too far? There’s a simple answer: Removing Russian access would constitute an economic shock that U.S. politicians and corporations would rather not instigate.

There’s a more complicated and consequential explanation, however, that has to do with anxiety over the U.S. dollar’s status as global reserve currency. SWIFT sanctions, rather than being a “nuclear option” thwarting Russia, could be the first domino in a sequence of events that bolster China- and Russia-backed alternative digital payment systems. Such sanctions might also, in the long run, steer emerging markets toward blockchain-based systems that would reduce global reliance on the U.S.-centric international monetary system. Altogether, SWIFT sanctions could very well incite the dedollarization of the world economy.

Over 11,000 financial institutions spread across more than 200 countries use SWIFT to communicate payments and securities transfers. The system was launched in 1977 by a coalition of banks and headquartered in Belgium, likely in part to convey the “strict neutrality” that SWIFT purports to uphold.

But the vast majority of SWIFT transactions are settled in U.S. dollars, which helps solidify the currency’s status as the global reserve currency. This gives the U.S. tremendous influence over the world economy, allowing the federal government to borrow at discounted rates, rack up national debt that now exceeds $30 trillion and exert influence over foreign nations through punitive monetary policy. Despite the supposed neutrality of SWIFT, the U.S. wielded its influence to boot Iran from the service twice. In both cases, the sanctions had the intended consequence of hamstringing the Iranian economy by limiting international trade.

### 2AC – Doesn’t Deter Russia

#### Sanctions don’t deter russia – status quo proves

Abigail Ng 22 [Abigail Ng, 3-11-22, “Relying on sanctions to stop Russia could go ‘terribly wrong,’ says Niall Ferguson,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/11/waiting-for-sanctions-to-stop-russia-could-go-terribly-wrong-niall-ferguson.html, smarx, HHW]

The strategy of sitting back and waiting for Russia’s war machine to grind to a halt because of sanctions could go “terribly wrong,” according to Niall Ferguson, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

“It’s a highly risky strategy,” he said.

The Ukrainian resistance cannot hold the fort for much longer, and sanctions by the West won’t be able to stop Russia in time, he told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Asia” on Friday.

He said the U.S. is relying heavily on sanctions and “very belated arms deliveries” to Ukraine, but he’s concerned that those fighting for Ukraine won’t be able to defend the country for long.

Though the Russians have sustained more casualties than expected, they are still “advancing steadily,” he said.

“The assumption that this is going to drag out, that the United States can sit back and watch the economic sanctions do their work may be gravely mistaken,” Ferguson said.

Anna Ohanyan of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) echoed that sentiment.

“While the sanctions will start biting — perhaps can change Putin’s behavior down the road — at this point, they cannot be relied on as an instrument to be used to stop the violence,” said Ohanyan, a nonresident senior scholar in CEIP’s Russia and Eurasia program.

“It won’t work fast enough to avert a Russian victory in Ukraine and I think this is the critical problem,” Ferguson said.

‘Nightmare scenario’

The U.S. and its allies have imposed wide-ranging sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. But it appears that there’s a race between Russia’s military advancements and the sanctions that are crippling Moscow.

“There’s no guarantee that Ukraine holds out, and what I dread is steadily worse news from Ukraine, and the breakdown of Ukraine’s defenses,” Ferguson said.

“We’ll sit there saying, oh, well the sanctions have really hurt Russia — but it won’t matter to Putin because he will be able to claim victory. That for me is the nightmare scenario,” he added.

Ferguson said the U.S. should help support Ukraine’s defenses without escalating it into a full-blown NATO-Russia war.

Arms deliveries to Ukraine slowed down previously, and now there is a “frantic effort” to help Ukraine keep up the fight, he said.

That, however, may create the conditions of a proxy war, CEIP’s Ohanyan said.

“It appears that unfortunately, [at] this point, sanctions and the military assistance work at cross purposes,” she said.

## AT: BWC CP

### Solvency Deficits

#### There are too many problems with the BWC for it to solve – funding, cooperation, and more are issues that it is dealing with right now

Kathryn **Millett**., 06-01-**17**, "Financial Woes Spell Trouble for the Biological Weapons Convention," Health Security, https://www-liebertpub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1089/hs.2017.0030

Strong stewardship is critical to the enduring health and strength of international disarmament treaties and the norms they uphold. Such stewardship involves significant investment of both political will and financial capital. Currently, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)—a cornerstone of the web of international efforts to ensure and protect global health security—seems to have neither, and the ramifications are significant. In November 2016, states parties to the BWC gathered together for the 5-year review of the operation of the convention. Such review conferences are opportunities to assess the health of the treaty and take decisions and recommendations to further strengthen its effectiveness and improve its implementation. Key issues requiring urgent action by states parties in 2016 included the modalities of cooperation and assistance efforts in responding to deliberate disease events, enhanced reassurance on treaty compliance, and a regular scientific and technological review process to ensure the treaty keeps pace with the rapid developments in the life sciences. Despite considerable preparatory effort by states parties, the review conference failed to reach consensus on any substantive issues or agree an intersessional work program. The sole outcome of over a year's hard work was agreement that the treaty would continue to function as before, while a Meeting of States Parties (MSP) would be held in December 2017 that would “seek to make progress on issues of substance and process for the period before the next Review Conference, with a view to reaching consensus on an intersessional process.” While the majority of attention focused on efforts to reach consensus on substantive issues—and the continuing disappointment of the failure to do so—another issue rumbled largely ignored in the background. Just prior to the review conference—and for the first time in the treaty's history—the BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) distributed a document prepared by the Financial Resources Management Service (FRMS) of the United Nations Office at Geneva detailing the status of states parties' financial contributions to the convention. This document demonstrated that 62% of states parties owed a combined total of US$596,519 to the treaty over the period 2001 to 2016 in unpaid assessed contributions. Concurrently, a number of presentations by the UN FRMS made during the review conference explicitly spelled out the consequences to states parties of the roll-out of the UN enterprise resource planning system, dubbed “Umoja”: under UN financial procedures, funds must be available before staff contracts can be renewed and meetings held; if there are insufficient funds, meetings cannot be convened and staff cannot be recruited or have their contracts renewed. Umoja does not permit crossing budget lines to make up shortfalls in other areas. In the run-up to a meeting, a review process will take place where a go/no-go decision will be taken 3 months ahead of the proposed meeting dates based on funding. While the implementation of the financial rules are causing havoc across a number of disarmament treaties (eg, the 5th Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons [CCW] was almost brought to a screeching halt in 2016, and all remaining scheduled meetings for 2017 are facing cancellation), these rules possess a greater significance for the BWC ISU than other similar treaty support agencies: Since the ISU is merely hosted by the UN and is not itself a UN body, it cannot draw on the regular budget of the UN and is thus dependent solely on the annual assessed contributions of its states parties. The ISU's financial instability is further compounded by the fact that its current funding arrangements do not permit recruitment of temporary staff to cover gaps in the ISU due to maternity leave or illness. Amid this new focus on finances came an extraordinary move from the BWC depository states (the Russian Federation, the United States, and the United Kingdom). In March 2017, the BWC depository states called on all states parties to pay their assessed financial contributions to the treaty and settle their arrears “without further delay,” warning that failure to do so could result in staff losses in the BWC ISU and cancellation of the forthcoming meeting of states parties in December. While a number of states responded rapidly to this urgent call and consequently enabled renewal of ISU staff contracts, as of the latest FRMS report of April 31, 2017, there remains –$473,195 in outstanding contributions shared by 114 (or 64% of) states parties covering the years 2001 to 2017. While a significant proportion of arrears reflects late payments of assessed contributions for the year 2017 (–$141,195), 4 states have not paid their assessed contributions since 2001 and another 8 have not paid any contributions over the past 5 years. One state party alone owns 63% of all debts owed to the BWC, accrued over the period 2001 to 2017. Conversely, several states have overpaid the BWC, the most notable among them being the United States's overpayment of around a quarter of a million dollars. However, the BWC still possesses a deficit of –$114,344: not enough to cover the meeting costs for 2017. With the planned 2017 meeting of states parties being the sole forum for making any progress on agreement of a substantive intersessional work program prior to the next review conference scheduled for 2021, it is of the utmost importance that states parties dig deep and make sure that there are sufficient funds to allow the meeting to be held. Of equal importance are measures to ensure financial sustainability of the convention and the ISU. There are a number of financial solutions that have been adopted by similar treaties and agencies that could be adapted to suit the needs of the BWC. For example, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) maintains a working capital fund that it uses to cover temporary financial shortcomings, while the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Peaceful Uses Initiative solicits extrabudgetary contributions that supplement its other funds when the need arises. Both funds ensure that the agencies possess the financial flexibility to quickly respond to financial shortages, requests for additional activities by states parties, and any unexpected needs or unforeseen emergency events. Another option would be to consider the establishment of a voluntary revolving capital fund as adopted in January 2015 by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). UNIDIR's “stability fund” has a $1 million goal for which 1-time donations are received from participating states on a rotating annual basis, ensuring that the fund is replenished each year. Extrabudgetary funding for the BWC is not new. The ISU has often received voluntary contributions from states parties in a position to do so, but these contributions are usually given on a project-by-project basis to fund the convening of a certain meeting or similar activity. The most significant of these contributions is from the European Council, which has supported the BWC through the adoption of 2 council decisions and which provides financial contributions to UNODA for activities in support of the BWC, including costs for 2 UNODA staff to carry out activities mandated by the decisions. Further, the BWC administers a sponsorship program funded by voluntary contributions from states that enable participants from developing countries to attend BWC meetings. The creation of a voluntary and non-earmarked fund that the ISU could employ as needed to cover any shortfalls in meeting and staffing costs would provide the BWC with the flexibility needed to cover urgent costs that cannot be achieved under Umoja rules. Further, by channeling overpayments by states parties into a central reserve, the ongoing unpaid arrears of recalcitrant states would no longer be masked by any overpayments and more pressure could be brought to bear on them to resolve their debts in a timely fashion. But any such monies would need to be held outside the Umoja system, which may not be possible. The above options could also be supported by the adoption of sanctions against states in arrears that would deny voting or participatory rights to states until their debts are settled or an appropriate reduction in arrears has been effected. Such a system has long been in use by the UN. Under Article 19 of the Charter, a UN member state in arrears of an amount that equals or exceeds the contributions due for 2 preceding years can lose its vote in the general assembly. An exception is permitted if the member state can show that conditions beyond its control contributed to its inability to pay. As recently as May 2, 2017, the UN invoked Article 19 to withdraw Libya's voting rights in the general assembly until such time as it has made the necessary payments to reduce its arrears below the specified amount. The OPCW has the option to invoke a similar procedure under rule 35 of the rules of procedure of the executive council. However, financial woes are not the only issue to plague the BWC. States parties have consistently shown a lack of the necessary political will to strengthen the BWC. Participation in BWC meetings has historically been low when compared with other disarmament treaties, and states have regularly failed to overcome political differences and point-scoring to agree on necessary measures to strengthen implementation of the treaty. In fact, the planned 2017 MSP has yet to appoint a chair, meaning that critical preparations and discussions prior to the meeting cannot be undertaken. Measures instigated by states parties such as the cooperation and assistance database remain woefully under-used by both states offering assistance and those seeking assistance, and the request from the Seventh Review Conference in 2011 for “States Parties to provide at least biannually appropriate information on how they implement Article X of the Convention to the ISU” saw submissions from just 10 states parties, 1 regional organization, and 1 group of states during the intersessional period of 2012 to 2015. Perhaps the most obvious evidence of a general lack of political will or interest in the BWC can be found in the level of annual confidence-building measures (CBM) returns. Despite a number of programs and efforts to enhance participation, the number of confidence-building measures returns per year has never risen above 45% of states parties. In fact, a third of states parties have never submitted a return, and, when returns are submitted, the quality of the information provided is often sorely lacking. This is particularly significant in the BWC context as the confidence-building measures represent the sole means by which states parties more formally provide reassurance of compliance with the provisions and obligations of the BWC. All across the disarmament sphere, treaties are under financial pressure. The continued use and threats of use of conventional and nonconventional weapons by states and non-state actors puts international weapons norms at risk. States parties must act to positively reinforce the norms against the use of banned weapons. Upholding the life-saving norms enshrined in international disarmament treaties is a difficult and costly business—one that requires considerable political commitment and financial investment. When states fail to invest in ensuring that treaties remain strong and well-resourced, it is humanity that ultimately pays the price. If BWC states parties truly value the norms against the use of biology as a weapon, they need to demonstrate this by putting their money where their mouth is.

#### Countries circumvent the BWC – it is really ineffective

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In 1990, the U.S. political and military leadership was significantly challenged by the possibility that Iraq, having the fourth largest offensive chemical and biological weapons program in the world at the time, might use those unconventional weapons against U.S. forces and its allies massing in Saudi Arabia. For all practical purposes, there was no real capability to rapidly detect and identify the deliberate release of anthrax spores or other biological weapons, and the U.S. military did not have sufficient vaccines or therapeutics for such an event. Due to this severe neglect to biological defense, former Secretary of State James Baker gave a formal letter to the Iraqi foreign minister stating that Iraq would “pay a terrible price” if it used chemical or biological weapons against the U.S.-led coalition.1 Had Saddam Hussein decided to use biological weapons, it could have caused thousands of casualties. Fortunately for U.S. forces, he did not have a significant biological weapons capability and there was no use of those weapons. Despite dark predictions of both nation-states and violent extremist organizations planning biological attacks against the nation, there has been no test of the U.S. military’s biodefense capability. A “biological taboo” resulting from decades of arms control discussions has held, despite the lack of a verification regime behind the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).2 Concerns about Iraq’s biological weapons capability in 2003 evaporated a year later, with nothing substantive to find. Despite concerns about a domestic terrorist biological incident following the anthrax attacks in 2001, there has never been a mass casualty attack caused by biological organisms in the United States since then. The Nation’s recent public health challenges in addressing the 2019 coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) have caused questions as to whether the U.S. military is sufficiently prepared for an adversary that might be emboldened to use biological weapons against U.S. national security interests. Despite the lack of any biological attacks or even threat of attacks over the past twenty years, the potential impact of a large-scale use of a contagious disease concerns enough people to call for new national strategies and improved response capabilities for biological threats. Current strategies aim to mitigate natural disease, to regulate biological research associated with the more hazardous biological diseases, and to improve the U.S. public health system to better respond to biological threats.3 Yet despite the development of four national strategies for national biodefense over the past twenty years, the U.S. government has not significantly advanced its capabilities for protecting against and responding to biological threats, defined as including natural diseases, deliberate biological releases, and laboratory accidents. Despite the high-level attention to this threat, assessments of the Nation’s capability to prepare for deliberate biological threats have not, however, been positive. Unclassified assessments from the State Department and the Department of Defense (DOD) suggest that China and Russia could have a biological weapons capability, as could North Korea and Iran.4 The lack of any actual use of biological weapons against the United States has perhaps diminished the concern that potential weaknesses exist. In the event of a future conflict with great powers, there is the chance that biological warfare could emerge as a significant threat, perhaps in a form unrecognized from Cold War experiences. Prior to attempting the implementation of yet another strategy to counter biological threats, the Army needs to establish the context of how adversaries would deliberately use biological threats against U.S. national security interests. Once a rational appreciation of the threat is developed, one can then create a defense strategy that directly addresses deliberate biological releases. Importantly, such a strategy needs to be resourced and implemented to address the future challenges of a deliberate biological release, understanding that natural infectious diseases pose a competing priority. Counter to the hypothesis that the pandemic outbreak has revealed potential vulnerabilities to biological weapons, COVID-19 has not in fact acted like a biological weapon. As a result, the lessons that apply from this contemporary crisis toward a biological weapons attack are few. A pandemic outbreak, affecting the general population over a year’s time, requires a different approach than military forces protecting themselves from a focused deliberate biological attack. COVID-19 is not lethal enough and does not incapacitate people quickly enough to qualify as a potential weapon, despite the more than 750,000 deaths caused over twenty-four months across the United States.5 A biological disease that does not significantly impact young, healthy people and that is easily countered by a national vaccine program is not prime material for a weapon system. COVID-19 may have slowed down economic activities, but it is not an existential threat to the U.S. government. Despite the potential impact on national security, pandemic diseases are best addressed separately from biological defense concepts. The U.S. military does anticipate the potential use of biological weapons in combat operations. In that light, the Department of Defense has a counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) strategy and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense concept to guide its efforts to prevent, protect against, and respond to adversaries using biological weapons.6 The ratification of the BWC has significantly reduced the number of potential adversaries that might use traditional biological warfare (BW) agents, allowing one to focus on particular actors and military scenarios. The traditional biological warfare agents such as anthrax, pneumatic plague, smallpox, and tularemia are still potent candidates for future warfare. However, the employment of said weapons may look very different than envisioned during the Cold War. North Korea may be the exception to this statement, as it is unclear how that nation would use unconventional weapons, but its operational concept for warfare appears to be based in an industrial age, massed firepower approach, similar to what NATO might have anticipated in the 1970s.7 China and Iran are assessed as not complying with the BWC, and Russia and North Korea are believed to have retained offensive biological weapons programs.8 While we can understand the biological warfare model that North Korea might employ, this does not necessarily apply to Russia’s and China’s concepts of employment for biological weapons. The Cold War model of using massive amounts of biological agents against troop concentrations, major population centers, and large military sites such as air bases and seaports requires large-scale production, storage, and testing capability. As Russia and China have modernized their nuclear and conventional forces, they have also changed their approach toward military confrontations with the United States and partner nations. While preparing for the possibility of total war, both countries have focused on conducting regional operations against U.S. allies using methods that fall below the threshold of open conflict.9 Their nuclear arsenals cast a coercive shadow over regional operations that allow those nations to aggressively push and attain their political objectives. As a result, a clandestine biological weapons program can offer them a capability to perform single, small-scale chemical or biological weapons attacks on focused targets (facilities or individuals) while claiming to be compliant with the BWC.10 The former Soviet Union had a massive biological warfare program, unmatched by any historical measure. Despite extensive documentation of this program, the Russian Federation has not fully acknowledged the former Soviet Union BW program. The State Department has gone so far as to designate specific Russian government facilities as “acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States” through their association as military defense facilities associated with a BW research program.11 These are not recent concerns. Analysts will point out that in 2012, then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin talked about creating “weapon systems that use different physical principles … (beam, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical and other types of weapons).”12 However, it is unclear that this attributed quote referred to a return to developing biological weapons to support military conflict. In 2019, Putin directed a budget of 220 billion rubles (or $3.3 billion) toward the development of genetic technologies that could support a wide range of applications (biomedical, agricultural, or biodefense).13 At the same time, the Russian government has claimed that the United States is building offensive BW laboratories in countries surrounding Russia through the Biological Threat Reduction Program. For instance, the “Lugar Center for Public Health Research” in Tbilisi, Georgia, was funded by U.S. defense funds, but its intent is to promote health security against natural infectious disease outbreaks.14 In response to U.S. government accusations of China’s role in the COVID-19 outbreak, Chinese government officials have recently echoed the same claims that the U.S. government has created biological weapons near their borders.15 This type of disinformation campaign falls squarely in the “gray zone” set of tools. Both China and Russia have ignored international efforts to prevent the proliferation of unconventional weapons technology and materials. China’s position as one of the leaders of the global bioeconomy increases its potential for realized or latent advanced biological warfare capabilities. Beijing appears committed to becoming a leader in biotechnology, which holds the promise of myriad public health applications. Yet, many biotechnology applications are dual-use, capable of delivering both public health benefits and advances in biological warfare capabilities. As one top U.S. expert noted, China “is pursuing a very aggressive strategy to become the world leader in biotechnology.”16 Sustained public and private investment in synthetic biology technologies needed for DNA sequencing and synthesis as well as gene editing have enabled China to develop a wide array of dual-use biotechnologies in the field of synthetic biology. Many experts anticipate that synthetic biology advances will enable the development of “new and novel biomaterials” to include advanced bioweapons.17 As a 2020 Brookings Institution study noted, “The determination of China’s one-party state to become a leading player in biotechnology is reflected by the rapid growth in investment in the sector. Some estimates claim that collectively, China’s central, local, and provincial governments have invested over $100 billion in life sciences research and development.”18 China’s sustained and sizeable government investment in domestic biotechnology has created an industrial base capable of developing and manufacturing a range of extant and novel biological warfare agents. And while the possibility of developing novel biological warfare agents is present, it is more probable that China wants to use its biotechnology lead to produce superior commercial pharmaceuticals and to enhance its military forces. There is always speculation that advances in the life sciences will drive an evolution in biological weapons, making them more lethal, more environmentally hardy, more targeted toward specific populations, or more able to confound contemporary detection systems. This belief used to be rooted in the 1970s rise of biotechnology, and then it was 1990s genetics driving the concerns. Today, it is the promise (and dangers) of synthetic biology. And while it is true that one could always improve characteristics of certain biological weapons, there are significant drawbacks as to such an approach.19 Assuming that an adversary might develop altered biological weapons to be more operationally relevant, this would still be a violation of treaty (if it were China or Russia) and international norms. Modifying a biological organism to enhance its resistance to antibiotics might in turn reduce other desired characteristics, such as its lethality or dissemination qualities. Any use of a genetically modified organism would run the risk of direct attribution to a particular source. Western military forces lack the capability to detect the deliberate use of biological weapons until after exposure. In addition, U.S. forces lack vaccines for a number of traditional biological warfare agents, let alone engineered diseases.20 Any nation with an advanced industrial capability can easily develop biological agents that can damage or destroy crops or livestock, in addition to targeting humans. There is no need for an overly sophisticated engineered biological warfare agent à la the latest James Bond movie, No Time to Die. And even if military forces had tactical biological detectors that could identify all biological warfare agents in a timely enough fashion to put on protective masks, traditional biological weapons would still be an effective strategic weapon against a civilian populace, its livestock, or cropland. There is no possibility that the United States and its Western allies can make biological weapons obsolete.21 At the same time, we do not need to overexaggerate the threat of biological weapons as some Hollywood scripts portray them. There are several options that could be explored. The traditional approach has been to develop chemical and biological defense as a combined operational concept. Both chemical and biological warfare agents use similar delivery systems and target the human body’s physiological response to hazards. Under the larger construct of countering WMD threats, the U.S. government can engage in arms control negotiations to limit biological weapons use, use preemptive strikes to target a nation’s WMD capability, and respond to its use with protective equipment that limits the impedance of combat operations. None of these options are singular to biological threats. A second option is to task the medical community to identify and respond to both biological warfare attacks and natural disease outbreaks while limiting reliance on biological detectors and technical experts. The U.S. Air Force, for instance, endorses a biological defense concept that is separate from chemical defense and that relies on the medical community for initial detection and identification.22 This is a very specific focus on biological threats that includes a conscious decision to limit investments in people and equipment in response to a lower probability of deliberate biological attacks. The Air Force concept is a subset of its counter WMD operations, as the Army’s CBRN defense efforts are. The U.S. Army recently released a biological defense strategy that calls for the “synchronized implementation” of both biological warfare defense and infectious natural diseases across the Army.23 Interestingly, the office responsible for implementing this strategy is the U.S. Army Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency, not the Army’s chemical-biological defense specialists and not the Army’s medical experts who respectively own those areas of expertise. It is not immediately clear as to whether this strategy calls for the development of a stand-alone biological defense concept that combines capabilities for both infectious natural diseases and deliberate biological releases, or just a single agency that manages two very different concepts (counter-WMD and force health protection) that have a common scientific origin. The strategy details four “lines of effort” that include developing and managing talent and facilities that address biological threats; maintaining a biological common operating picture and awareness of biological defense forensics; building a readiness posture that includes protection, response, and training for biological defense capabilities; and directing modernization efforts for biological defense concepts and doctrine. Will this new governance structure fundamentally change how the Army does biological defense? Given policy and budget direction, probably not. This is not the first time a military agency has suggested moving all biodefense activities into a portfolio for medical countermeasures for infectious diseases. There is an almost instinctual movement toward putting medical experts in charge of developing capabilities for countering all biological threats; however, that does not work for two reasons. First, given a collection of biological threats—whether natural, deliberate, or accidental—medical leaders will always consider infectious natural diseases the most important concerns because of the large numbers of service members and their dependents who get sick from natural diseases. And there are a lot of infectious natural diseases to address. In 1990, the U.S. military found itself without adequate vaccines for anthrax and botulin toxin when it was preparing to face an Iraqi military force that had an active chemical and biological weapons program. This was due to a deliberate decision to deprioritize research and development for biological warfare agents and focus instead on countermeasures for natural diseases such as chikungunya virus and diarrheal diseases. Second, while the response to biological threats has often had a common core, the prevention and protection against biological threats certainly does not. While one can try to deter adversaries from using biological weapons, Mother Nature cannot be deterred. Protecting military forces from biological weapons during combat operations requires a completely different approach than protecting a military base’s population from natural diseases. This requires a level of nuance to understand that a single biodefense concept cannot protect fundamentally different populations with different requirements and facing fundamentally different biological threats. There is a reason why there are different budgets and authorities for dealing with biological warfare agents, natural biological diseases, and biological research laboratory accidents. The primary purposes of any strategy document are to identify a specific mission or program, to identify policy objectives that should drive discrete programs, and to offer a plan to achieve those objectives. In the military, this is called “ends, ways, and means.” Ideally, a strategy will also aid decision makers in moving resources toward those goals that require funding to achieve those objectives. So, the problem with a biological defense strategy that aims to address all biological threats—whether at the Army, the DOD, or national level—is that there are multiple agencies with budget elements who are already directed to address specific biological threats. I will argue that at least five biological threat sectors require consideration in any biological defense strategy: disease prevention as a function of public health, bioterrorism response as a function of homeland security, military biodefense as a function as countering WMD, biosurety as a function of laboratory practices, and biosecurity and biosafety as a function of agricultural and food industries. None of these are new security concerns. Each has a dedicated government agency that focuses on a distinct threat using a congressionally approved budget. Because each biological threat sector already has a lead agency and agenda to pursue, the question comes as to what a centralized biological defense strategy would change or impact the direction of federal government or military biodefense programs. Public health efforts addressing infectious biological diseases, to include aspects of disease prevention in the military’s force health protection program, have been around for more than one hundred years. One of the challenges in the U.S. public health program is that it is federalized, meaning that states and local jurisdictions implement public health programs while the federal government provides research and funding for specific purposes. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health represent the largest government agencies in this area, putting tens of billions of dollars against infectious disease research, surveillance, and response. Within the military, the Army’s Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases has a research and development program for infectious diseases to address potential biological threats to service members in U.S. and overseas theaters. Top threats include tuberculosis, measles, influenza, pneumonia, and malaria. Bioterrorism response is a little more nebulous, since we have not seen a terrorist group successfully use a biological hazard to cause mass casualties in the United States since 1984. However, following the 2001 Amerithrax incidents, the concern that they might has thrown a few billion dollars a year toward the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Health and Human Services to develop response plans for the possibility.24 The DOD needs to consider biological terrorism within its installation force protection plans, but for the most part, it is not an integral part of that effort due to the very low probability of such an incident. The DOD does have a massive CBRN Response Enterprise that would assist states and cities in any federal response to a biological terrorist incident. The top (realistic) biological threats usually include salmonella, ricin, botulinum toxin, sewage, and tainted body fluids. Military biodefense has focused on protecting U.S. forces from biological warfare agents developed by adversarial nation-states for the purpose of combat operations. We have always envisioned biological weapons attacks as large-area coverage, mass casualty events on the battlefield. Because of technical challenges, military biodefense capabilities were largely lacking during the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict, leading to a crash program in the mid-1990s to develop biological detectors and medical countermeasures for the services. Biological detection and vaccines were more readily available in 2003 as U.S. forces prepared for possible Iraqi biological weapons use. There is a central program office that manages all DOD biological defense programs, receiving maybe a half billion dollars a year for funding. Their top threats include anthrax, pneumonic plague, smallpox, tularemia, and brucellosis. The DOD’s Biological Threat Reduction Program, which is more of an effort to secure other nations’ laboratories and hospitals than biodefense, accounts for less than a $300 million in annual funding over the past decade.25 Biosurety addresses the security and safety of laboratory research labs both across the United States and within the U.S. military. Unlike traditional biodefense efforts, biosurety is more about keeping biologicals safe from humans, as opposed to the other way around. The threat includes both the possibility that a researcher on the inside might deliberately or accidentally release a dangerous biological organism, or that an outsider might try to break in and steal them. There is also the danger of natural disasters or externally derived accidents to consider. The U.S. Army has had biosurety failures that resulted in CDC shutdowns at its Dugway Proving Ground (in 2015 due to anthrax shipments) and Fort Detrick laboratories (in 2019 due to unsafe laboratory practices). While the CDC has some oversight role for a small set of select agents and toxins, in general, the CDC can only provide suggestions on how the U.S. research and development community should implement good business practices. This area is not well funded (maybe $500 million/year) or overseen from the federal level. The top threats for biosurety are too varied for listing, but in general, accidents are largely limited to individual researchers and not the general community surrounding a biological research lab. Biosecurity and biosafety challenges within the agricultural and food industries have been of two parts. First, many facilities have significantly large amounts of livestock or crops to protect against the introduction of any foreign disease that might wipe out their livelihood. In addition, foreign pests or animals could displace or eliminate native animals and crops. Second, there is the challenge of regulating food products as they are moved from the farm to the table, as the saying goes. Federal regulations aim to ensure that agricultural products used in meal production are both safe and accurately labeled. Both the Food and Drug Administration and U.S. Department of Agriculture have responsibilities to oversee this area, in addition to the Customs and Border Patrol. There is not a significant DOD equity in this area other than ensuring that meals prepared for the field are safe and free of contamination. Because Congress is very interested in ensuring that the public has safe food and a variety of different foods, this area gets funded between $3 billion and $4 billion a year. Its biological threats of concern include foot-and-mouth disease, swine flu, avian flu, wheat rust, and invasive species such as Asian carp, zebra mussels, cane toads, and brown marmorated stink bugs. This is just the tip of the challenge of trying to address all biological threats—natural, deliberate, and accidental—under one Army, DOD, or national strategy. There are more complex discussions as to what would constitute a national biosurveillance effort—surprisingly, this would not be solely focused on infectious biological diseases to humans, but also include diseases affecting animals and plants, as well as chemical or radiological hazards to any biological organism. There is the challenge of addressing the impact of future technologies such as “gain-of-function” and synthetic biology. Even after we identify all of the potential issues that surround “biological threats,” there is the question of who ought to lead the effort. The public health community claims that if it were better funded, it could address all natural disease outbreaks as well as respond to biological terrorism. The national security community feels that it needs to have a larger voice in this effort, given that these are foreign threats that impact the armed forces and other U.S. national security interests. And given the national security community’s funding and ability to quickly form new project offices, they could very well dominate the discussion, which could result in different priorities than what the public health community sees as important. Concluding Thoughts The military’s primary concern should be on deliberate biological threats, but there is no question that it has been distracted by COVID-19 and the general topic of natural disease outbreaks. If the DOD’s Chemical-Biological Defense Program decides to move from working on countermeasures to biological warfare agents and focus instead on “threat-agnostic” systems that address all biological threats, the military will not get necessary detectors, protective ensembles, medical vaccines, or decontaminants for biological warfare agents due to the larger number and greater impact of natural infectious diseases. This is, in essence, what happened in the 1980s; because the military medical community was focused on research and development for infectious diseases and not biological warfare agents, U.S. forces were unprepared for biological warfare in 1990.26 Military concepts of future war assure us that biological and nuclear warfare are expected threats to U.S. forces.27 In the case of a conflict with North Korea, it may not look that different than Cold War concepts of massive, large-coverage attacks on U.S. military bases. In the case of China and Russia, it is less clear what the future of biological war will be. As technology such as drone swarms, artificial intelligence, and synthetic biology continue to mature, the shape of biological warfare threats will evolve. One can assume that the traditional biological warfare agents will still be viable candidates, or possibly enhancements on their natural forms. Terrorist use of biological hazards may be limited to crude toxins and improvised delivery systems—still a threat to installation force protection measures, but not necessarily a mass casualty event. This future operating environment requires us to focus on enhancing the survivability of critical infrastructure—in particular, command and control, power projection, and logistics bases—and the resiliency of military operations while impacted by biological weapons. The only way to succeed in moving forward in a future biological defense posture is not, then, to dilute the Army’s efforts by trying to manage the development of defensive capabilities for all natural disease outbreaks and deliberate biological attacks under a single general construct. There needs to be a laser-sharp focus on both pandemic preparedness and biological defense during combat operations. In addition, the DOD needs to ensure that its biological research and development laboratories have the best practices in place to avoid future shutdowns due to biosurety challenges. This is not an either/or discussion nor is it the time to radically revise how military forces accomplish biological defense. Instead, Army leaders need to engage in these discussions, despite the complicated technical nature of the topic, and ensure that future operations can be maintained despite the threat of biological weapons use.

### AT: Bioterrorism

#### Bioterrorism is just myths – analysis proves. And there is no impact.

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Interestingly, although there are no doubt many features that distinguish the two topics, the public’s perception of bioterrorism, in its broad sense, shares some striking features with the human interest in viral haemorrhagic fevers, as seen during the recent ebolavirus disease outbreak in Guinea [1]. Although the overall risk of disease propagation and spread beyond the immediately involved patients is limited, interest in these phenomena rises to an almost hysterical level during an outbreak situation, and then collapses as quickly as it built up immediately after the worst seems to be over. No matter how far away the outbreak may be, and how remote the risk of spread is, some features (the agent striking apparently out of the blue, and then ‘disappearing’ again; the disease being gruesome and killing cruelly, at least in the beginning of an outbreak) make the waxing and waning public response, often tinged with sensationalism, a characteristic feature accompanying viral haemorrhagic fever outbreaks that is not dissimilar to the reaction towards perceived or real bioweapon threats. In this CMI theme issue, we attempt to answer the important question of whether bioterrorism is a myth or reality, which is of relevance for clinical microbiologists, hospital hygiene specialists, infectious diseases clinicians, basic researchers, defence specialists, and public health policy-makers. In this issue, we also decided to address several key questions, listed in Table 1, with the input of biosafety officers and bioterrorism specialists from three different countries. We aimed at providing a concise overview on key facts and current points of discussion, rather than providing an exhaustive textbook-like inventory and bibliography. Consequently, we are confident that this compilation of articles constitutes a highly informative and also gripping read. In the first article, by Jansen et al. [2], the definitions of biological warfare, biocrime and bioterrorism are provided, clearly separating terrorist from criminal use of biological agents. Jansen et al. also provide a very precise and exhaustive list of biological agents that have been involved in bioterrorism events, and that may serve as a basis for assessing the real threat, and thus pitching the level of awareness and preparedness of the various stakeholders at the most appropriate level. In addition, this article provides some information for infectious disease specialists, including the main clinical syndromes, incubation times, mortality rates and treatment options for all listed ‘bioterrorism agents’. Moreover, this article highlights the fact that, in the 20th century, only ten events were recorded during the first 70 years, whereas 17 and 153 events were recorded from 1970 to 1989 and from 1990 to 1999, respectively. This raised another question: does the higher number of events registered more recently reflect the reality, or is it only the result of a strong reporting bias? If this the case, we may wonder why, when and how our perception has become biased. To answer the latter question, Barras and Greub [3] performed a detailed historical analysis of reported events from ancient times through to the 21st century. Although there is no doubt that, on several occasions, biological agents have been used to cause panic and terror among civil populations, their true frequency of use and impact remain very difficult to appreciate, because: (i) data are largely lacking from before the Pasteurian microbiology era; (ii) reality was often hidden and manipulated by politicians, as the ‘truth’ about biological attacks may not be openly disseminated, given its intrinsically non-ethical nature, and because information may be classified as secret by the authorities, as it may be considered to be sensitive; and (iii) the passage of time adds an additional layer of complexity, by distorting facts. Thus, although illustrations such as the one provided on the cover of this special issue may suggest the dissemination of plague by the use of infected arrows, such illustrations may also simply represent an allegory of the contagiousness of Yersinia pestis. The detailed historical analysis conducted by the authors includes the contemporary period, which is a period dominated, in terms of bioterrorism, by the anthrax letters attack, which resulted in at least 45 infections requiring hospitalization. The importance of the anthrax letters attack led most clinical microbiology laboratories to develop diagnostic approaches for the detection of Bacillus anthracis. As outlined by Jaton and Greub [4], the level of preparedness progressively increased, although most initial procedures were simply based on the procedures used for suspected haemorrhagic fever. However, as shown in Table 2, there are major differences between a suspected bioterrorism attack and the detection of a naturally infected haemorrhagic fever case that should be taken into account. Also important is the fact that most clinical microbiology laboratories progressively decrease their preparedness when the threat decreases. Therefore, in order to reduce the risk of not being adequately prepared, it is important to have regular exercises using true quality controls (Fig. 1) or using plasmid-based positive controls, as using ‘real’ biosafety level 3 agents may be difficult, owing to their association with significant biological risks. Finally, Wurtz et al. [5] highlight the problems that inevitably arise from the strict legislation aimed at making unlawful access to and experimentation with potential bioweapon agents impossible. The unwanted adverse effect is that well-intended, and much needed, research for the ‘right’ reasons has also become difficult, if not completely unfeasible, in some respects. The article of Wurtz et al. will stimulate fresh debate on how best to strike the balance between protecting the public from aggression involving biological agents, and allowing the biomedical research that is needed to keep the ‘real-life’ natural infectious agent at bay and to enable progress in our understanding of the ecology, epidemiology and best diagnostic, prevention and treatment options for what may constitute a minute bioweapons threat, but a real natural threat. We conclude that bioterrorism and smaller-scale atrocities involving biological agents do indeed constitute a reality—a reality surrounded by myths. We hope that this series of articles will facilitate reasoned discussion of a problem whose absolute and relative dimensions may be limited, but that we must not ignore.

## AT: Hotlines

#### Hotlines fail – Pakistan and India prove

Muhammad W. Haider & Tahir M. Azad 8-3-21 Azad: King’s College London Haider: National Defence University Lancaster University [THE ROLE OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE EVOLUTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222>] // DHS WAgustin 🛏

Pakistan and India have engaged in military and nuclear CBMs on numerous occasions, despite non-cordial relations. The first step in the military CBMs was the establishment of a hotline between the militaries in 1971 following the model of the United States’ and USSR's military communications in the same timeframe ([Ahmar 2001](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222), 87). However, the hotline between the Director Generals of Military Operations of both countries remained symbolic, and no practical advantages were effectively achieved for maintaining peaceful relations. The hotline works well during peacetime while it gets suspended during crises build-ups, rendering it, in essence, useless. The sitting prime ministers of both countries, Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi, signed the next major CBM under the umbrella of the Nuclear Threat Initiatives. This CBM aimed to prevent attacks on each other's nuclear facilities but does not provide any prevention against foreign allies attacking such installations. This measure enabled the exchange of a list of nuclear facilities between both the countries in 1992 (Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan [1992](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)) which helped to build trust and both the nuclear rivals respected the arrangements during the peace as well as during times of increased crisis. In 1991, Pakistan and India's CBMs progressed further as they signed an agreement for prior notification regarding military exercises and air space violations, especially near the LoC. This set of CBMs opened further channels of communication in the military and diplomatic domains to avoid the repetition of earlier crises but it could not achieve the desired results owing to the non-availability of implementation structures. The next CBM milestone was the 1992 agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons—both countries declared that they do not possess any chemical weapons. However, these CBMs suffered a considerable setback once India declared its chemical weapons arsenal under the Chemical Weapons Convention ([Nuclear Threat Initiative 2011a](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)). Such incidents created further suspicion between both countries—which were already having problematic relations—and halted the advancement in the process of confidence building. Pakistan considered the incident as a violation of the bilateral agreement which widened the gulf in trust deficit between the two countries. In the wake of this incident, no further progress was achieved until 1999. Later, Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee concluded the Lahore Accord in 1999, which was a milestone agreement for peacebuilding following the nuclear tests in 1998. This agreement incorporated the concept of developing and employing CBMs in both the conventional military and nuclear domains to avoid any untoward nuclear weapons launch situations and to reduce the prospects for future conflicts ([Nuclear Threat Initiative 2011b](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)). Unfortunately, this set of CBMs was undermined by the Kargil Conflict, which started a few months after the declaration. This time it was the Pakistani side that undermined the peace efforts as political and military leaderships were not on the same page. Here the political leadership tried to put some mechanisms in place for peaceful coexistence, but the military institution spoiled these efforts. This problem necessitates the requirement of structures that can implement and sustain CBMs without significant interference from any state institution, military in particular. From 1999 to 2003, tensions remained high between both the states due to large-scale deployments along the LoC, plus terrorist attacks in Srinagar and on the Indian parliament. The UN General Assembly session of 2003 carved out a route toward a ceasefire and later on to direct negotiations between the political leadership of both countries ([Khawaja 2018](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222), 120–121). A new set of military and nuclear CBMs was then worked upon which included the reduction of troops along the LoC, no further development of military posts, and prior information regarding the testing of ballistic missiles ([Krepon 2017](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)). The composite dialogue process constituted a major step forward which aimed to resolve the issues between both countries through a strategy that satisfies the demands of both countries ([Padder 2012](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)). This dialogue process provided the opportunity to discuss the peace process through a diverse range of domains including the Kashmir issue. However, all these CBMs halted in 2008 ([Gul 2007](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)) after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai for which India blamed Pakistan. Later, very few efforts were initiated in 2014 and 2015, but those did not work due to pre-existing notions of trust deficit and further accusations of terrorist attacks. The primary issues in the implementation of the military and nuclear CBMs are the non-availability of a framework, transparency issues, and lack of trust. Political aspects will also play a significant role in the success of any military and nuclear CBMs, yet military and security concerns continue to undermine political will between these two states. While Pakistan and India are so-called democratic countries, they do not have liberal democratic structures and the separation of powers remains a contentious issue. Additionally, the policies adopted through CBMs proved to be thoroughly incompatible with follow-up actions because the military and political leadership in both countries remained suspicious of each other. These issues obstructed the implementation of military and nuclear CBMs in both letter and spirit. The recurring crises between Pakistan and India after the Pulwama attacks of 2019 highlight the shortfalls of the concept of nuclear deterrence between both South Asian neighbors. Cyberspace also provides a new domain for waging wars and there are no existing agreements between Pakistan and India in this domain. A cyber-attack may prove disastrous in provoking an unintentional war in the region ([Yamin 2019](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211030222)).

## AT: China Tech Coop

#### China says no – US and China are locked in a stalemate

Sam Bresnick & Paul Haenle 2-21-22 Sam Bresnick is assistant editor and senior research analyst Paul Haenle holds the Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He served as the White House China director on the National Security Council staffs of former presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. [Why U.S.-China Relations Are Locked in a Stalemate, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/21/why-u.s.-china-relations-are-locked-in-stalemate-pub-86478>] // DHS WAgustin 🍞

Fifty years ago this week, former U.S. President Richard Nixon flew to China, setting the stage for a dramatic shift in relations between the two countries. Much has changed since that visit, not always for the better. Despite a flurry of diplomatic activity over the past year, U.S.-China ties remain tense. Discussions in [Alaska](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56452471) and [Tianjin](https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-shermans-visit-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/) yielded few, if any, breakthroughs. While friendlier in tone, the recent summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden led only to [agreements](https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/17/xi-biden-summit-us-china-policy/) to hold yet more talks, albeit on important issues such as strategic stability. The lone bilateral bright spot has been some cooperation on [climate](https://www.state.gov/u-s-china-joint-glasgow-declaration-on-enhancing-climate-action-in-the-2020s/). Since the summit, the Biden administration [announced](https://www.npr.org/2021/12/07/1062016949/president-biden-announces-a-diplomatic-boycott-of-the-being-winter-olympics) its diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics and [added](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/17/2021-27406/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-an-entry-on-the-entity-list) more Chinese companies to its trade restriction list while Congress passed a [bill](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-passes-bill-targeting-china-over-uyghur-forced-labor-n1286160) aimed at countering China’s forced labor abuses in Xinjiang. The two sides’ antagonistic stances on issues related to security, economics, technology, and ideology have largely crystalized, leaving little space for the adjustments that could relieve simmering tensions. Below, Paul Haenle and Sam Bresnick analyze how the two countries got here and how they can move forward. WHY ARE THE TWO SIDES STUCK? Former U.S. President Donald Trump ushered in a more confrontational era in U.S.-China relations, and Biden has largely maintained his predecessor’s approach to Beijing, albeit with a more equanimous tone and embrace of multilateralism. The U.S. government has for decades been concerned by China’s mercantilism, rapid military modernization, and illiberal approach to human rights, but it had held out hope that China might liberalize through increasingly robust contact with the rest of the world. That has not happened, and the United States and others have lost patience with China’s state capitalist system, militarization of the South China Sea, and increasingly [authoritarian governance](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/china-hong-kong-security-law.html). But Beijing is not backing down. Despite facing pronounced international pushback during the pandemic, Xi has become even more confident in China’s economic system, governance model, and approach to international affairs. “Time and momentum are on China’s side,” he [argued](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3117314/xi-jinping-says-time-and-momentum-chinas-side-he-sets-out) last year at a high-level meeting, though many analysts accuse the party of [overconfidence](https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-From-leader-to-students-overconfidence-clouds-China). At the same time, Chinese officials are increasingly looking askance at their U.S. counterparts. Many appear to believe that the United States, though still a formidable power, is in the early stages of an [inevitable decline](https://www.economist.com/china/2021/03/31/china-is-betting-that-the-west-is-in-irreversible-decline). Just as China resumes its rightful place atop the hierarchy of Asian nations, Beijing’s thinking goes, the United States’ unresolved racial justice issues, income inequality, and political polarization will catalyze an irreversible diminution of U.S. power in Asia and across the globe. Complicating matters further, the U.S. and Chinese publics are increasingly distrustful of each other. A whopping 89 percent of American respondents to a recent [survey](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/03/04/most-americans-support-tough-stance-toward-china-on-human-rights-economic-issues/) from the Pew Research Center consider China a competitor or enemy, while around [two-thirds](https://uscnpm.org/the-pulse/) of Chinese respondents view the United States unfavorably or very unfavorably. Such negative mutual perceptions would likely hamper each side’s ability to recalibrate its approach to the other. Finally, the two sides’ divergent framings of the relationship are contributing to the ongoing [stalemate](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202107/t20210726_9134602.html). Discussions with high-level Chinese scholars and former government officials have revealed that Beijing prefers to define the bilateral relationship as a peaceful coexistence guided by shared principles, consensus, and possible cooperation. China is frustrated that the United States is more focused on competing with and confronting Beijing. In Washington, however, great power rivalry, defined more by competition and confrontation than cooperation, has become the central framework for bilateral ties. HOW HAVE THESE DIFFERING VIEWS AFFECTED POLICYMAKING? The pronounced turn in U.S. policy toward China, beginning with the Trump administration, has not led to self-reflection on the part of Beijing. Chinese scholars and experts initially appeared somewhat [surprised](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/world/asia/china-trade-war-trump.html) that many of the economic, security, and technology policies that Beijing has pursued for years have recently precipitated robust policy responses from the United States. The ruling party believes that it is merely continuing down the same path it established some years back, which has led to its attributing the downturn in the bilateral relationship solely to the United States. Chinese government officials appear to believe the United States’ goal is to “[suppress](https://news.cgtn.com/news/3245444e77554464776c6d636a4e6e62684a4856/index.html)” China’s rise. They [cite](https://www.economist.com/china/2021/09/25/china-believes-that-america-is-forging-alliances-to-stop-its-rise) the Trump administration’s [policies](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213441.shtml), as well as Biden’s [AUKUS submarine pact](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3151700/aukus-alliance-what-it-what-does-it-have-do-china-and-why) and the Quad’s [increasing coordination](https://www.npr.org/2021/03/11/975469203/quad-summit-biden-looks-to-boost-coordination-against-china), as evidence of Washington’s desire to [contain](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1246562.shtml) China and limit Beijing’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, many Chinese scholars and experts view U.S. restrictions on sensitive technology exports to China as [proof](https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3164367/china-must-brace-digital-cold-war-us-battle-tech-supremacy) that the United States seeks to hamper its burgeoning tech sector. Finally, they [see](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1220502.shtml)U.S. complaints about human rights violations in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet as disingenuous, given the United States’ own problems with racial justice and homelessness, as well as its high levels of wealth and income inequality. In short, China sees the United States as a declining power that is attempting to keep a rising China from overtaking it. The United States, as expected, has a very different view of bilateral dynamics. Washington blames the downturn in relations on China’s increasing assertiveness abroad and repressiveness at home. U.S. officials are concerned that China, through its support of authoritarian regimes, is chipping away at the liberal international order and trying to create “[a world safe for autocracy](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-06-11/world-safe-autocracy)”; that its continued military modernization and interest in building bases in [Cambodia](https://amti.csis.org/changes-underway-at-cambodias-ream-naval-base/), [Equatorial Guinea](https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-first-military-base-on-africas-atlantic-coast-u-s-intelligence-finds-11638726327), and the [United Arab Emirates](https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=dubai+chinese+military+bas) will allow Beijing to challenge Washington’s security primacy; and that its state capitalist, mercantilist system threatens the rules-based economic order. Beijing’s incarceration of around [1 million Uighurs and other Muslim minorities](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang) in Xinjiang, increasingly strict online censorship, and prosecution of dissidents have further fueled Washington’s desire to enact more aggressive responses. WHAT DOES EACH SIDE WANT OUT OF THE RELATIONSHIP? Our conversations have revealed that China wants the United States to afford it the space it believes it deserves as a rising power, at least in its own backyard. Beijing, as the preeminent Asian security and economic actor, sees the United States’ military presence in East and Southeast Asia as inherently threatening. Moreover, it hopes that Washington will ease pressure, especially regarding economics and technology, as well as refrain from engaging in ideological competition in service of impugning Beijing’s governance model and human rights record. But perhaps China’s most significant wish is for the United States to acknowledge the legitimacy of its economic and political systems. Given that the United States views China’s economic and political practices as antithetical to its own, as well as to those of countries acting within a healthy, properly functioning international system, Washington is unlikely to refrain from impeaching Chinese authoritarianism, mercantilism, and treatment of ethnic minorities and dissidents. The United States’ tougher policies and more confrontational approach are meant to push back on and defend against a range of Chinese domestic and foreign practices that threaten to undermine the international rules and norms that have been in place since the end of World War II, as well as raise the costs for China to revise that very order. In general, Washington would prefer that Beijing dial back or eliminate its economic and innovation mercantilism, respect other countries’ sovereignties, agree to peacefully resolve disputes, and abide by international agreements on human rights. HOW CAN THE TWO SIDES RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES? Biden has opted to use a calmer, more restrained tone with Beijing than did his predecessor, with the aim of avoiding escalation. Moreover, unlike some Trump administration [officials](https://www.wsj.com/articles/secretary-of-state-pompeo-to-urge-chinese-people-to-change-the-communist-party-11595517729), Biden’s team has made it clear that Washington is not seeking regime change in China. And though Biden [criticized](https://www.cfr.org/election2020/candidate-tracker) Trump’s lack of a clear set of goals or a coherent interagency policy framework for addressing the China challenge, his administration has yet to release its long-awaited [China strategy](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-01-14/washingtons-missing-china-strategy) (though China does figure prominently in its recently issued [Indo-Pacific Strategy](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf)). Until that document is issued, the finer points of the administration’s plans to compete with Beijing, as well as the end goal of such competition, will remain fuzzy. A clear articulation of U.S. aims would be helpful in Washington’s efforts to secure greater international cooperation from allies and partners in addressing the challenges China poses. It would also provide Chinese and U.S. leaders a starting point from which to negotiate the future of bilateral ties. In China, there is considerable room for greater self-reflection. Chinese leaders should closely examine how Beijing’s own aggressive diplomacy, economic statecraft, military buildup, and human rights violations have alarmed and unsettled the United States and many other countries, especially those in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Across many conversations, few, if any, Chinese experts have acknowledged that Beijing’s actions have played a role in the cratering of U.S.-China relations. Furthermore, they are reluctant to acknowledge that numerous nations’ hardening stances toward China are driven by China’s activities rather than U.S. coercion. Acknowledging its agency in harming relations, as well as its ability to take proactive steps to put U.S.-China ties on better footing, would constitute important initial gestures by the Chinese side. Moreover, China’s willingness to take more responsibility for its own actions and modify its policy and rhetoric would go a long way toward stabilizing bilateral dynamics. There is no doubt the U.S.-China relationship will remain competitive going forward. Preventing bilateral ties from becoming even more hostile and adversarial, however, should constitute a common aim for both countries. Biden understands this, as he stressed the importance of developing guardrails and establishing strategic stability talks between the two governments [during his virtual summit](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/16/readout-of-president-bidens-virtual-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/) with Xi. Implementing robust crisis management mechanisms would also prove a useful step in augmenting both nations’ abilities to control escalation in the event of a military incident in the increasingly crowded waters and air space off of China’s eastern and southern coasts. Washington and Beijing also should establish an effective problem-solving mode for the bilateral relationship. Many observers stress the importance of U.S.-China cooperation on transnational issues where the two sides have common interests—[climate change](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2021/10/28/rebuilding-us-chinese-cooperation-on-climate-change-the-science-and-technology-opportunity/), [nuclear nonproliferation](https://www.brookings.edu/research/revitalizing-nonproliferation-cooperation-with-russia-and-china/), and [global health](https://www.csis.org/analysis/advancing-us-china-health-security-cooperation-era-strategic-competition), among others. These efforts are certainly important, but they are quite ambitious and often hampered by Washington’s and Beijing’s different approaches to managing international issues. The two countries have thus far failed to make progress in most areas. That does not mean they should abandon these efforts. But perhaps the United States and China should devote more energy toward trying to create a problem-solving approach for addressing more pointed irritants, such as limits on journalist visas and consulate closures. Such a method has already yielded dividends regarding the [former issue](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/16/us/politics/us-china-journalists.html). The two countries should focus on how to build on those smaller successes to work through larger problems in other areas. By committing to this pragmatic approach, the United States and China may be able to find a way to put a floor under deteriorating relations, begin to build goodwill, and lay the foundation for taking on the larger structural issues in areas, like trade and technology, that will be key to determining the future health and welfare of the U.S.-China relationship over the long term. Despite the two nations’ differing mindsets and approaches to bilateral ties, starting small could prove the best method through which to, eventually, realize large gains.

## AT: Russian Sanctions

#### Sanctions fail – They hurt the people NOT the military or leaders

Rami Al-Khalifa Al-Ali 6-5-22 Writer for Saudi Gazette [The failure of Western sanctions against Russia, <https://www.zawya.com/en/world/uk-and-europe/the-failure-of-western-sanctions-against-russia-gycrd12k>] //DHS WAgustin

Historically, sanctions have failed to achieve any political goals. It is the worst weapon that the modern and contemporary international system has produced. Every time when sanctions were imposed, it was the people who paid the price, while these sanctions failed to harm the leaders and officials in the targeted countries. With the beginning of the Russian war on Ukraine, a series of Western sanctions are being slapped on the Russian side, and that has covered almost all fields. This is up to the extent that one of the Western universities canceled a lecture on Tolstoy on the pretext that he was a Russian! The Western nations wished that their sanctions would be so crushing and thus deal a fatal blow to the Russian economy, and hence they have frozen Russian deposits as well as Russian assets abroad, leaving no room for the Western hand to reach unless it was punished. The worst scenario was the attempt to isolate Russia from the global banking payment system called SWIFT (The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) as this makes import and export a very complicated affair even though it would be possible. The Russian economy absorbed the first blow, despite the sagging ruble, but it quickly recovered, and even achieved higher gains than before the war. The obvious question that must be asked by Western circles: what is the purpose of these sanctions? The answer, as presented by Western politicians, is twofold: the first is the weakening of the Russian economy, which affects the stability of the Putin government and undermines confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin on the Russian street. However, the results of these sanctions were counterproductive and the proportion of opponents of the war is very small on the Russian street, and President Putin’s popularity is on the rise. The second aspect is the effect on the Russian war machine. It is true that there were many difficulties experienced by the Russian forces, especially in the beginning of the war, and the failure to capture Kiev, and this forced the Russian leadership to change its military plans. But this has nothing to do with the Western sanctions. Rather, the armed forces, like the Russian economy, have regained their solidity and seemed more capable of achieving breakthroughs and steady military progress. This does not mean victory in the war, but it means that the Russian forces were not affected by the aforesaid sanctions. The Western sanctions on Russia made the supply of Ukrainian grain a very difficult issue, even if it was done in relatively small quantities, and Russia's isolation from the SWIFT regime made the supply of Russian grain no less difficult. If we know that both countries export 30 percent of the grain worldwide, it can be understood that the food crisis that the world is beginning to suffer from, and which threatens impending famines that might afflict a large number of the third world countries, even though these countries have no part in the Ukrainian war or in the conflict between the West and Russia. The worst is that the European societies themselves have begun to suffer from the rise in the prices of essential goods, as the prices of fuels increased by up to 40 percent, and this led to a rise in most essential goods, especially foodstuffs. After the experience of the past months, the Western sanctions on Russia are like those who shoot themselves in the feet. In fact, Moscow has benefited from sanctions on the energy sector. What it was unable to export was compensated by the rise in oil prices. It is clear that the West must change its strategy, and this can only be done by bitterly admitting that it has failed miserably in its policy of imposing sanctions against Russia.

## AT: REM/REE

[cross apply cohesion key answers]

#### Environmental costs cause backlash

**Subin**, BA, ‘**21**(Samantha, associate reporter for CNBC Pro and CNBC.com and has a BA in in multiplatform journalism and general business from the University of Maryland, Published 4/17/22 by CNBC, accessed 7/19/22, “The new U.S. plan to rival China and end cornering of market in rare earth metals”, <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/17/the-new-us-plan-to-rival-chinas-dominance-in-rare-earth-metals.html>)//mw

While companies like Lynas and MP Materials are eager to ramp up the domestic supply chains, extracting **rare earths is a difficult process** due to a combination of environmental, technical and political factors. Many regions, including the European Union, have an abundance of these resources but lack the expertise that other countries like China have in the processing and magnet production, Nakano said. The **rare earths industry has come under fire for environmental concerns**. Many **r**are **e**arth **e**lement**s reside among mineral deposits with radioactive materials** that can leach into the water table. Mining, processing and disposal can also contribute to ecosystem disruption and release hazardous byproducts into the atmosphere. Although the U.S. is making strides to advance the rare earths supply chain and develop alternatives to mining rare earths, environmental regulations are often more stringent than inside China. In recent years, **Lynas came under scrutiny** from activists and the Malaysian **government for radioactive waste that it produces as part of its enrichment process**. Lynas has said that the low-levels of radioactive waste were not dangerous and the Malaysian government ultimately [renewed the license](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lynas-corp-malaysia/malaysia-defends-move-to-extend-licence-for-rare-earth-firm-lynas-idUSKCN1VP1K6) and [green-lighted a construction plan](https://www.mining.com/lynas-gets-green-light-for-waste-treatment-plant-in-malaysia/) for a permanent disposal and waste treatment facility in August 2020.

#### Biden already invested $35 million

**Hirneisen ‘2/22** (Madison, a staff reporter covering California for The Center Square, published 2/22/22 by The Center Square, accessed 7/19/22, “Biden, Newsom announce $35 million investment in rare-earth mineral mining”, https://www.thecentersquare.com/national/biden-newsom-announce-35-million-investment-in-rare-earth-mineral-mining/article\_8d1060e6-9434-11ec-a9cf-6f20234b1569.html)//lexmw

**Biden** [**announced**](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/22/fact-sheet-securing-a-made-in-america-supply-chain-for-critical-minerals/) **a $35 million investment for Mountain Pass Materials** on Tuesday, **the only rare-earth mining and processing site in the U**nited **S**tates. Biden said the funds will help create a "fully domestic supply chain" for the magnets that power technology like wind turbines and electric vehicle motors. The new **multi-million dollar investment** announced on Tuesday **comes on top of $700 million** **that Mountain Pass Materials plans to invest by 2024** to create a rare earth supply chain in the U.S. "These new investments are going to do more than create good paying jobs, they are also going to set America up to lead the world and build a clean energy economy and the clean energy future," Biden said on Tuesday. Mountain Pass Materials, which is based in California, was started five years ago and has since become the second-largest producer in the world of rare earth materials, James Litinsky, CEO of Mountain Pass Materials, said during Tuesday's news conference. **The company** [**mines and recovers**](https://mpmaterials.com/what-we-do/#our-process) **r**are **e**arth **e**lements **used to power digital tech**nologies, electric vehicles, **clean energy**, **and** even certain **military control systems.** The company estimates that through a partnership with General Motors, it will be able to produce enough magnets for 500,000 electric vehicles per year with the materials it recovers at its facility. Biden noted on Tuesday that investments in these kinds of processes and operations would help the U.S. compete with China, which currently controls most of the global market for these minerals. "We can't build a future that's made in America if we ourselves are dependent on China for the materials, the power [and] the products of today and tomorrow," Biden said.

#### $140 million from the infrastructure bill went to domestic supply chains– proves investment alone is not enough

**DOE ‘2/14** ( US Department of Energy, federal government agency that manages the United States' nuclear infrastructure and administers the country's energy policy and funds scientific research, published 2/14/22 by the DOE, accessed 7/19/22, “DOE Launches $140 Million Program to Develop America’s First-of-a-Kind Critical Minerals Refinery”, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-launches-140-million-program-develop-americas-first-kind-critical-minerals-refinery)//mw

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today released a [Request for Information (RFI)](https://www.fedconnect.net/FedConnect/default.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2ffedconnect%2f%3fdoc%3dDE-FOA-0002686%26agency%3dDOE&doc=DE-FOA-0002686&agency=DOE) on the design, construction and operation of a new facility to demonstrate the commercial feasibility of a full-scale rare earth element (REE) and critical minerals (CM) extraction and separation refinery using unconventional resources. When built, this first-of-a-kind facility, supported by **$140 million investment from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, will** support American manufacturing jobs, and help **build a strong domestic supply chain for** the next generation of clean **energy technologies** vital to reaching President Biden’s goal of a net-zero emissions future. “Applying next-generation technology to convert legacy fossil fuel waste into a domestic source of critical minerals needed to strengthen our supply chains is a win-win — delivering a healthier environment and driving us forward to our clean energy goals,” said U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm. “With **the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law’s investment** in the **build** out of this first-of-its kind critical minerals refinery, we are moving ideas from the lab to the commercial stage **and demonstrating how America can compete for the global supply chain to meet the growing demand** for clean energy technology.”Across the United States, there are billions of tons of coal waste and ash, acid mine drainage, and produced water. The legacy wastes left behind by coal mining and related activities all contain a wide variety of valuable minerals and materials. Each of them offers an untapped resource for producing a wealth of critical minerals. REEs and CMs are essential materials that are used in a broad range of technologies that are significant to national security and energy, such as advanced aircraft, wind turbines, electric vehicles, semiconductors, and hydrogen fuel cells. Currently, even when REEs are being mined within the U.S., they are shipped overseas for processing, before being sold back to the U.S. in more expensive products.